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THE KIDNEY DONOR SCHOLARSHIP ACT: HOW COLLEGE 
SCHOLARSHIPS CAN PROVIDE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR KIDNEY 
DONATION WHILE PRESERVING ALTRUISTIC MEANING 
JAKE LINFORD* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When I was a child, my father sold several hundred acres of property, 
some of it to the local county government, and some of it to a company that 
mines phosphate.  After I graduated from college, I remember walking with 
Dad through one of these parcels of property that he no longer owned, 
located directly behind his house.  The property had been in our family for 
three generations, and I viewed it as part of an inviolable whole.  I remarked 
that it was sad to think that this property was no longer in our family.  He 
bristled at the statement, and offered the following rejoinder: “that property 
put you through school.” 
I reflected then that my affection for the property was not stronger than 
my attachment to and dependence on my undergraduate degree and the 
opportunities that it afforded me.  When viewed through the lens of my 
emotional attachment to the property as a symbol of our family, it seemed 
invaluable, in the sense of something to which a price should not be 
attached.  When I looked at the property through the lens of the 
opportunities it afforded, it took on a different meaning—it became a 
symbol of my father’s sacrifice to meet his children’s needs.  The property 
was no longer “invaluable,” while the education its sale had enabled had 
become so. 
I contrast this story with one of meaningless loss, also from my father’s 
life.  When Dad was fifteen years old, he was injured while riding an inflated 
inner tube down a snowy hill.  The accident damaged his kidney, which had 
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to be removed.  For the past forty-two years, Dad has lived with one kidney.  
The loss of the kidney has not seriously impacted his health.  In fact, he 
played for the Wyoming High School Class A state championship basketball 
team during his senior year.  There is no symbolism attached to Dad’s lost 
kidney, other than the lesson that inner tubes are not a safe mode of 
transportation down snowy hills. 
I saw a connection between these stories as I considered the shortfall in 
the supply of transplantable kidneys in the United States.  The current 
procurement regime cannot meet the need for kidneys, and the burden of 
these shortages falls disproportionately on people of color.  In 2006, 
approximately 4,400 people died while waiting for a kidney.1  On average, 
a Black person waits nearly twice as long for a kidney as a White person.2  
The status quo is unacceptable both on moral and economic grounds.  
Those who wait for a donated kidney are relegated to a limbo of dialysis, 
cut off from many productive endeavors.  In addition to the personal losses, 
the economic costs of dialysis are also significant. 
The kidney shortfall has inspired intense discussion regarding how best 
to address shortages in an equitable and ethical manner.3  Two prominent 
scholars highlight the seemingly unconquerable gulf between two theoretical 
poles.  Dr. Arthur Matas, a prominent transplant surgeon, argues that 
“barring kidney sales is tantamount to sentencing some patients to death.”4  
Dr. Francis Delmonico, a Harvard University professor of medicine—and, 
until recently, the president of the United Network for Organ Sharing 
(UNOS)—fears a system of commodification would exploit poor, vulnerable, 
and unhealthy populations, and cause altruistic donation to “wither away.”5 
This article responds to a challenge issued by Michele Goodwin to 
bridge the gulf between these theoretical poles by moving from a discussion 
of whether or not to commodify to a discussion of what degree of 
commodification might be acceptable.6  The question that remains in the 
 
 1. Laura Meckler, How Much Is that Kidney in the Window?: A Radical Idea Goes 
Mainstream—Selling Human Organs, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, at 1B. 
 2. MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY PARTS 45 
(2006) [hereinafter GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS] (reporting that in 2003, Blacks waited an 
average of 1,891 days compared to 840 days for Whites). 
 3. See, e.g., Rob Stein, States Revising Organ-Donation Law: Critics Fear Measure May 
Not Go Far Enough to Protect Donors, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2007, at Al. 
 4. Meckler, supra note 1. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Michele Goodwin, Private Ordering and Intimate Spaces: Why the Ability to Negotiate 
is Non-Negotiable, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1367, 1369, 1384 (2007) [hereinafter Goodwin, 
Private Ordering] (arguing that until society begins discussing what degree of commodification 
is socially acceptable, organ donation regimes are unlikely to fully incorporate all members of 
society). 
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breach between these positions is whether a limited or regulated system of 
commodification—what scholars have referred to as “rewarded gifting” as 
distinguishable from “rampant commercialism”7—might increase the supply 
of transplantable kidneys while preserving altruistic giving and protecting 
potentially vulnerable populations from exploitation.  This article proposes 
an academic scholarship incentive8 for living kidney donors as a means of 
addressing the shortage of kidneys in a way that protects the best aspects of 
the current altruistic regime.9  While a scholarship incentive has been 
mentioned as a way of incentivizing increased donation,10 this article is the 
first to seriously examine whether a scholarship incentive could be capable 
of preserving altruistic giving while reducing the current shortfall in kidney 
procurement. 
The scholarship program envisioned would provide tuition, fees, and 
living expenses at a four-year university or a job-training program to which 
the donor-scholar qualifies for admission.  The program would be limited to 
participants age eighteen or older.  The program’s informed consent 
requirements will mirror those currently in use at organ transplant centers, 
and all information necessary to insure donor capacity to provide informed 
consent would be communicated to the donor-scholar only after the donor-
scholar reaches the age of eighteen.  Finally, each donor-scholar would 
have access to a health care professional unaffiliated with a recipient group 
and would have access to aftercare provided by the program. 
This article identifies four problems with the current system for procuring 
kidneys, and argues in Part II that a scholarship incentive for living donors 
should provide positive solutions for each problem area.  First, any system 
of commodification must address the effect of commodification on altruistic 
giving.11  Altruism purists hold that altruistic giving will wither in the presence 
of a market system, and that there will be a resulting net loss in kidneys 
procured for donation.  This article addresses the concern that a 
commodification regime will necessarily lead to a drop off in altruistic 
 
 7. A.S. Daar, Rewarded Gifting and Rampant Commercialism in Perspective: Is There a 
Difference?, in ORGAN REPLACEMENT THERAPY: ETHICS, JUSTICE, COMMERCE 181, 182 (Walter 
Land & John B. Dossetor eds., 1991). 
 8. This article will look primarily at the implications of an academic scholarship to a 
four-year institution.  The program could easily be adapted to job training in a variety of 
nonacademic settings, an option also provided for soldiers under the G.I. Bill. 
 9. While the scholarship program could work equally well for the donation of a lobe of 
liver, for the sake of simplicity, the article deliberately limits the discussion to a kidney 
scholarship. 
 10. Michele Goodwin, The Body Market: Race Politics & Private Ordering, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 
599, 617 (2007) [hereinafter Goodwin, The Body Market]. 
 11. See id. at 632-33 (noting the current debate among scholars regarding the effect of 
developing a framework that advocates organ commodification while preserving altruism). 
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donations by reviewing a series of attitudinal surveys which suggest that the 
less an incentive resembles a direct payment, the more palatable it becomes 
to society in general, and the more likely it is to increase, rather than 
decrease, the supply of kidneys suitable for transplant.  Second, living 
donation can ameliorate some of the logistical issues created by relying on 
deceased donation.12  Third, contrary to the presumptions of some 
academics, a system of living donation should reduce the incidence of 
diseased kidneys procured for transplant.  Finally, the scholarship program 
can and should be structured to reduce the current racial imbalance 
experienced on organ waitlists. 
The article then addresses arguments frequently raised against 
commodification and argues that the proposed scholarship incentive can 
effectively respond to these arguments.  In Part III, the article explains how 
the scholarship incentive as conceived occupies a rhetorical position which 
suggests that it presents an acceptable mode of rewarded gifting.  Because 
scholarships are understood as manifestations of altruism, the scholarship 
incentive can be designed to preserve spaces where altruistic giving will be 
both desirable and essential.  This Part also analyzes ethnographies of 
altruists, including kidney and liver donors, to argue that the “fragility” of 
altruism suggested by some authors is more imagined than real.  An 
examination of the nature of altruistic giving suggests that donors currently 
willing to donate under the exclusively altruistic regime will not be 
discouraged from donation by a regime of rewarded gifting like the 
scholarship incentive. 
In Part IV, the article addresses issues of coercion.  Critics assert that the 
commodification of kidneys threatens to coerce the participation of poor 
and underprivileged populations, even when donation is not in the best 
interest of the potential donor.  These critics ignore the coercive pressures 
already present in the current allocation regime, which pushes American 
need for kidneys into foreign markets where American law cannot effectively 
reach to protect underprivileged donor populations.  While a raw cash-for-
kidneys regime might create problematic coercive pressure, the proposed 
scholarship incentive can mitigate the coercive power of commodification.  
Research into brain morphology and decisional heuristics suggests that the 
delayed nature of the proposed scholarship incentive will protect the 
decisional capacity of donor populations in a way that an upfront cash 
payment cannot.  Part IV concludes by arguing that members of the 
 
 12. This article uses the term deceased donation throughout as a blanket term to indicate 
two types of cadaveric donations: those contemplated by the donor before death and 
committed to through a method like a donor card, and those where the family makes a 
decision at the time of death to donate a deceased donor’s kidneys without any indication that 
donation was the donor’s desire. 
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emerging adult population—individuals aged 18 to 25—have sufficient 
decisional capacity to make informed choices about whether to donate, and 
that the scholarship program would not impair that capacity. 
Finally, in Part V, the article discusses the obstacles to the scholarship 
proposal embedded in the current statutory regime, and argues that the 
treatment of athletic scholarships provides a workable analogy for the 
proposed scholarship incentive for kidney donation.  The article then 
concludes by suggesting a more directed study of public attitudes towards a 
hypothetical scholarship, and eventually, a pilot scholarship program, 
allowing society to measure whether the potential benefits suggested in this 
article can be realized. 
II.  PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT ORGAN PROCUREMENT PROCESS 
Measurable economic benefits would result from reducing the number 
of patients on dialysis and the scholarship incentive can provide 
commensurate economic benefits to the recipients of higher education.  The 
first problem with the current system of kidney procurement and allocation is 
that there are simply not enough kidneys to meet the demand. 
A. Lack of Kidneys 
In 2008, 4,410 persons died while waiting for a transplantable kidney.13  
There were 79,749 potential recipients waiting for a kidney on May 11, 
2009, and approximately 74,000 in 2007.14  In 2008, there were 16,517 
donor kidneys recovered: 5,967 kidneys from living donors, and 10,500 
kidneys from deceased donors.15  Need outstripped supply by roughly 
57,000 kidneys in 2007, and that gap grows each year.  Those waiting for 
kidneys are usually consigned to dialysis as a stopgap measure of 
preserving their lives by mechanically executing part of the cleaning function 
that healthy kidneys provide.  Dialysis is a measure so unattractive that some 
Americans with the financial wherewithal avoid the wait by going to foreign 
 
 13. ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, NATIONAL DATA, at 
www.optn.org/latestData/step2.asp? (choose “Waiting List Removals” and “Kidney,” then 
select “Death Removals by State by Year”) (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (referring to the chart “All 
States” under the year “2007”).  The data contained on OPTN’s website is updated on a daily 
basis and subject to change based on future data submissions or corrections.  Id. 
 14. ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, DATA, at www.optn.org/data/ 
(last visited May 11, 2009) (“Waiting List Candidates as of Today - Kidney”). 
 15. ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, NATIONAL DATA, at 
www.optn.org/latestData/step2.asp? (choose “Transplant,” select “Kidney,” then choose 
“Deceased Donor Transplants in the U.S. by State,” and “Deceased Donors Recovered in the 
U.S. by Donor Age”) (last visited Apr. 9, 2009). 
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countries.  Unfortunately, the residents of those countries are potentially 
more vulnerable to predation by the unscrupulous and criminal.16 
Dialysis costs between $60,000 and $90,000 per year.17  The average 
life span of a patient on dialysis is five years,18 thus, unless a donor kidney is 
located, the average cost of dialysis per patient is approximately 
$372,000.19  The estimated cost of transplant surgery, and five years of the 
immunosuppressant drugs necessary to keep the recipient’s body from 
rejecting the new kidney, is approximately $124,000.20  The rough net 
savings over the five-year period is $248,000, or $49,600 per year. 
That simple economic picture doesn’t take into account the quality of life 
costs of dialysis.  Scholars estimate that the social welfare costs of dialysis 
are over $1 billion; “many (or most) of those patients experience energy 
loss, nausea, weakness, hypertension, bone disease, infections, 
atherosclerotic disease, and other problems that emanate from the 
treatment itself.”21  Those numbers do not take into account the physical 
and emotional toll on patients, many of whom cannot work,22 and who as a 
group are twice as likely as non-dialysis patients to commit suicide.23 
It is difficult to argue against the benefits of getting patients off dialysis 
and back to a normal life by providing a kidney.  Herein lays the basic 
proposal of this article: offer educational scholarships as an incentive to 
those who make a living donation of a kidney.24  If handled correctly, the 
 
 16. See, e.g., Karen Russo, U.S. Couple in Kidney Racket Claims Ignorance: India Will 
Detain N.Y. Pair Until They Provide Information on Shady Enterprise, ABC NEWS, Jan. 30, 
2008, at http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Story?id=4217154&page=1 (last visited Apr. 9, 
2009) (reporting that an American couple was detained by Indian authorities for using the 
services of an illegal kidney racket whereby donors were forced to donate at gunpoint). 
 17. See Betsy Rogers, Goodnight, Dialysis, WASH. U. IN ST. LOUIS SCHOOL OF MED. 
OUTLOOK, at http://outlook.wustl.edu/summer2002/dialysis.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) 
(noting that in-center dialysis costs $70,000 a year); Goodwin, The Body Market, supra note 
10, at 634. 
 18. Sahar Kajbaf, Graham Nichol & Deborah Zimmerman, Cancer Screening and Life 
Expectancy of Canadian Patients with Kidney Failure, 17 NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS 
TRANSPLANTATION 1786, 1786 (2002). 
 19. Arthur J. Matas & Mark Schnitzler, Payment for Living Donor (Vendor) Kidneys: A 
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 4 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 216, 218 (2003). 
 20. Id. at 218 tbl.1 (illustrating an estimated cost of $72,693 for the first year after 
transplantation and $12,814 for maintenance the following two years thereafter). 
 21. DAVID L. KASERMAN & A.H. BARNETT, THE U.S. ORGAN PROCUREMENT SYSTEM: A 
PRESCRIPTION FOR REFORM 35, 68 (2002). 
 22. Id. at 35. 
 23. Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures 
Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 37-38 n.110 (1989). 
 24. While the program could also provide a scholarship to the family of a donor who 
commits to deceased donation in case of accident, this article deals primarily with the benefits 
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scholarship program could encourage sufficient donation to meet the 
current need, as well as provide a sustainable supply of kidneys for future 
needs.  The average cost of tuition at a four-year private institution was 
$29,307 for the 2007-2008 academic year.25  In-state tuition at a state 
college is significantly more affordable.26  The savings of transplantation 
over dialysis could easily pay that amount and still provide substantial 
savings to the party (generally Medicaid) that would originally have been 
obligated to pay for dialysis. 
To briefly outline the important features of the program: the scholarship 
incentive would pay tuition, fees, and housing for students who make a 
living donation of a kidney.  The program would not qualify a particular 
donor for a particular school, but would pay for educational expenses at a 
college, university, or trade school that has accepted the donor. 
The program would be limited to students eighteen years of age or 
older.  All medical information necessary to meet informed consent 
requirements must be provided after the donor has reached eighteen years 
of age.  Donors would receive consultation with a nephrologist unconnected 
with the recipient’s transplant team to assure that there is no undue pressure 
to complete the donation process.  All donors would receive comprehensive 
psychological screening, as well as screening regarding family support 
structure and general health.  Potential donors who are considered a poor 
match for donation due to psychological, health or other factors will not be 
selected for the program.  However, evaluating physicians would not 
consider an interest in the educational scholarship grounds to find a donor 
unfit. 
B. Could Scholarships Help? 
The scholarship program will only be worth the effort if it will increase 
the net supply of kidneys available for transplant.  This requires more than 
simply encouraging donors to donate, but requires some evidence that a 
financial incentive like a scholarship will not discourage the altruism that 
fuels the current procurement system.  Several scholars argue that it is 
unlikely that any incentive program will produce a net increase in kidney 
 
of living donation.  As discussed in Part II.C and D infra, there are logistical reasons to think 
that living donation is preferable to deceased donation. 
 25. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, INST. OF EDUC. SCI., MINI-DIGEST OF EDUCATION 
STATISTICS 2008, at 53 (2009), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/2009021.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2009). 
 26. The average cost of in-state tuition at four-year public institutions for the 2007-2008 
academic year was $12, 944.  Id. 
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donation.27  It is difficult to demonstrate empirically that any program of 
commodification will encourage Americans to donate, although there is 
some evidence that citizens of foreign countries who are economically 
desperate will donate a kidney, often for what Americans would consider to 
be minimal compensation.28  This part of the article reviews a number of 
attitudinal surveys conducted among various groups.  The overview of these 
studies suggests that the correct incentive program could produce a net 
increase in donation.  These studies also suggest that incentives which are 
structured more like a reciprocal gift and less like a direct market transaction 
are viewed more favorably by both the general public and by groups more 
directly related to the procurement process.  This article also recognizes the 
general limit of attitudinal studies.  While scholars have found a limited 
correlation between what respondents say they will do in a hypothetical 
situation and what they decide when faced with an actual decision,29 
“attitudes are not synonymous with behavior.”30  A second limit presented by 
the attitudinal studies reviewed is that the majority of them inquire into 
attitudes regarding deceased donation, and thus may have limited 
descriptive power in predicting responses to an incentive for living donation 
like the proposed scholarship program.  Finally, only one study offers the 
option of a scholarship incentive to respondents, and that study fails to 
provide any details regarding the percentage of respondents favorably 
disposed.31 
 
 27. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Prottas, Buying Human Organs—Evidence That Money Doesn’t 
Change Everything, 53 TRANSPLANTATION 1371, 1371 (1992) (reporting on the results of a 
1986 attitudinal study in which seventy-eight percent of “those surveyed reject the idea that 
families of donors ought to be paid for granting permission” to have organs donated). 
 28. Madhav Goyal et al., Economic and Health Consequences of Selling a Kidney in 
India, 288 JAMA 1589, 1590, 1591 (2002) (reporting that 305 residents of Chennai, India, 
received an average of $1,070 for selling one kidney).  It should be noted, however, that this 
amount is more than the average yearly income in India of $950.  See The World Bank, India 
at a Glance, available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/ind_aag.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 
2009) (reporting that in India the average yearly income in 2007 was $950). 
 29. See Monica A. Landolt et al., They Talk the Talk: Surveying Attitudes and Judging 
Behavior About Living Anonymous Kidney Donation, 76 TRANSPLANTATION 1437, 1437-38 
(2003) (citing two broad reviews of psychological literature which find a limited correlation 
between individuals’ reported intentions and their actual behaviors). 
 30. Stephen J. Kraus, Attitudes and the Prediction of Behavior: A Meta-Analysis of the 
Empirical Literature, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 58, 71 (1995). 
 31. Raymond L. Horton & Patricia J. Horton, Improving the Current System for Supplying 
Organs for Transplantation, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 175, 177-78 & n.2 (1993) 
(reporting—without providing details—that in a study of 465 adults in an unspecified “local 
community,” both the general respondent population and registered organ donors favored an 
option where organ donors would be provided with “a voucher that could be used for college 
tuition or job training of heirs” over a cash incentive). 
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The attitudinal studies reviewed break down into several categories.  The 
largest category is comprised of nine separate attitudinal studies where 
respondents were randomly selected from the general population.  In five of 
these studies, respondents indicated that incentives that were in-kind (like a 
payment toward unpaid, uninsured medical expenses) or non-monetary (like 
donor recognition or priority placement on the organ waitlist) were generally 
better received than monetary incentives (like cash in exchange for donating 
a kidney).32 
A smaller pilot study by John H. Evans33 concluded that the type of 
incentive matters in the realm of kidney donation because when it comes to 
 
 32. See Leonieke Kranenberg et al., Public Survey of Financial Incentives for Kidney 
Donation, 23 NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS TRANSPLANTATION 1039, 1040 tbl.1, 1041 (2007) 
(reporting, from an internet questionnaire of 550 paid Dutch respondents, that while financial 
incentives for kidney donations were generally viewed unfavorably on a five-point Likert 
scale—46.6% of respondents rated them unfavorably or very unfavorably, compared with 
25% that rated them favorably or very favorably—respondents who responded positively to 
incentives favored lifetime health insurance (66.2%) over a lump-sum cash payment to donors 
(33.8%)); J.D. Jasper et al., The Public’s Attitudes Toward Incentives for Organ Donation, 31 
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2181, 2181-82 (1999) (reporting in a study of 300 prospective 
jurors at a county courthouse in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, who served as respondents in 
exchange for a candy bar, that “[p]olicies offering in-kind incentives (e.g., a $1,500 payment 
toward unpaid, uninsured medical expenses) or nonmonetary incentives (e.g., donor 
recognition) were generally considered more appropriate than policies offering monetary 
incentives (e.g., $1,500 in cash).”); T.J. Cossé et al., Public Feelings About Financial 
Incentives for Donation and Concern About Incurring Expenses Due to Donation in One US 
City, 29 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 3263, 3263 (1997) (reporting that in a three year telephone 
survey of adults in the metro Richmond, Virginia area, more respondents favored a 
contribution to funeral expenses for the families of deceased donors (thirty-five percent agreed 
or strongly agreed on a 5-point Likert-type scale in 1994; thirty-five percent in 1995; and 
forty-percent in 1996) than favored a cash payment to families making a donation of a 
deceased relative’s organs (thirty-two percent agreed or strongly agreed in 1994; twenty-six 
percent in 1995; and thirty percent in 1996)); Thomas G. Peters et al., Organ Donors and 
Nondonors: An American Dilemma, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2419, 2421 tbl.2 (1996) 
(reporting results of a 1992 telephone survey of randomly selected respondents conducted by 
UNOS, where respondents indicated that they were very interested or somewhat interested in 
the following incentive options: (1) preferred donor status (fifty-nine percent); (2) $2,000 
toward funeral expenses (fifty-four percent); (3) $2,000 charitable contribution (fifty-two 
percent); (4) limited life insurance (forty-six percent); and (5) $2,000 cash payment (thirty-five 
percent)).  The Peters survey also reports that younger respondents were most favorably 
disposed towards the cash incentive of any age group (fifty-three percent of respondents aged 
eighteen to twenty-four indicated they were very interested or somewhat interested in the cash 
incentive, compared with thirty-five percent of respondents overall).  Id. at 2421 tbl.2. 
 33. John H. Evans, Commodifying Life? A Pilot Study of Opinions Regarding Financial 
Incentives for Organ Donation, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1003, 1010-14 (2003) 
(measuring the responses of eighty-six students in a graduate level health policy class to a 
variety of end-of-life vignettes where respondents must rate on a ten point scale—where one is 
“absolutely not” and ten is “absolutely”—whether a hypothetical family should terminate life 
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commodifying the products of the body, “a dollar is not a dollar . . . [and] 
[p]eople tend to consider dollars that circulate within the same institutional 
sphere to have the same moral status.”34 
Other general population attitudinal studies report a general favorable 
response to incentives for organ donation in the abstract.35  Two Gallup 
polls, the first taken in 199336 and the second in 2005,37 indicate an 
increasing willingness on the part of survey respondents to consent to 
 
support for a family member, and the family is faced with one of four hypothetical incentives: 
(1) $2,000 for funeral expenses; (2) a $25,000 voucher for the patient’s medical expenses; 
(3) $25,000 in cash for the family to use as they wish; or (4) the altruistic status quo).  Evans 
reports a positive correlation between a variable in the vignettes increasing amounts of 
medical debt for the family with an increased strength of recommendation that the family 
terminate life support.  Id. at 1019 (stating, based on the correlation between a growing debt 
variable and the recommendation to end life, that “[h]aving a health care system where 
people ultimately are responsible for their bills is enough to make people evaluate the price of 
keeping someone alive.”).  Evans found that the $25,000 cash incentive does not encourage 
respondents to recommend ending life support, but that the two voucher plans actually 
increased the frequency with which respondents indicated that the family should not terminate 
life support.  Id. at 1019-20.  Evans found a statistically significant negative correlation 
between increasing debt and the health insurance voucher, which he concludes indicates a 
discounting of the debt when presented with the medical bill voucher, but not for the other 
incentives.  Id. at 1021-22. 
 34. Id. at 1022 (internal citations omitted).  Evans concludes that the medical bill voucher 
is commensurate, or from the same sphere as the mounting debt from medical bills, and that 
there is not a statistically significant correlation between cash payments or funeral vouchers 
and the debt variable because they provide “fungibility outside of the medical sphere.”  Id. at 
1022.  Evans also posits that “equating the surgical removal of organs with an object outside 
of the medical sphere—such as the college education the family could buy with the $25,000 
hypothetical payment—violates our sense of the sacredness of these institutional boundaries.” 
Id.  Evans’s study does not measure responses to a scholarship voucher, and it is unclear 
whether responses would be different were the respondents considering vignettes regarding a 
decision to make a living donation of a kidney. 
 35. See A. Guttmann & R.D. Guttmann, Sale of Kidneys for Transplantation: Attitudes of 
the Health-Care Profession and the Public, 24 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2108, 2108 (1992) 
(reporting that members of the Canadian public and medical profession interviewed reported 
that forty percent of respondents indicated that a hypothetical dialysis patient of Canadian 
heritage should be allowed to purchase a kidney, while forty-nine percent indicated that a 
hypothetical patient of Indian heritage should be able to buy a kidney). 
 36. THE GALLUP ORG., INC. FOR THE PARTNERSHIP FOR ORGAN DONATION, BOSTON, 
MASSACHUSETTS, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC’S ATTITUDES TOWARD ORGAN DONATION AND 
TRANSPLANTATION: A SURVEY (1993) [hereinafter GALLUP 1993]. 
 37. THE GALLUP ORG. FOR THE DIVISION OF TRANSPLANTATION HEALTH RESOURCES AND 
SERVICES ADMIN., 2005 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION ATTITUDES AND 
BEHAVIORS 3-4 & tbl. 1 (2005), available at ftp://ftp.hrsa.gov/organdonor/survey2005.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2009) [hereinafter GALLUP 2005] (reporting in tbl.1 the results of 2,341 
telephone interviews measuring the attitudes of the public regarding organ donation). 
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donate their organs38 or the organs of a deceased family member39 if 
offered a financial incentive.  The 2005 Gallup poll also indicated an 
apparent polarization, with more respondents indicating that financial 
incentives would make them less likely to donate increasing over time (8.9% 
reporting they were less likely to donate their own or a family member’s 
organs in 2005 vs. 5% reporting they were less likely to donate their own 
organs and 8% indicating they were less likely to donate a family member’s 
organs in 1993).40  The Gallup polls do not distinguish between types of 
financial incentives. 
Two studies compare the attitudes of next-of-kin who chose to donate a 
deceased relative’s organs with next-of-kin who were approached but chose 
not to donate.  A study by James R. Rodrigue and his associates41 reports 
that next-of-kin donors contemplating a hypothetical generic financial 
incentive to encourage kidney donation indicate a slight decrease in their 
willingness to donate,42 while next-of-kin nondonors indicate a slight 
increase in the willingness to donate.43  Rodrigue and his associates 
expressed some concern that financial incentives offered to next-of-kin were 
not likely to lead to increased deceased donation rates, but that they might 
well increase participation by donors themselves.44  It should be noted, 
however, that the Rodrigue study did not distinguish between financial 
incentives, and that its ability to predict the response to a particular incentive 
is therefore limited.  Laura Siminoff and Mary Beth Mercer also conducted a 
study of next-of-kin, finding moderate levels of approval for a variety of 
 
 38. In 2005, 16.6% of survey respondents indicated “they would be ‘more likely’ to 
donate their own organs if paid an incentive,” an increase of 4.6% over a response to a 
similar question in the 1993 Gallup poll.  Id. at iv, 23. 
 39. Respondents also indicated an increased willingness to donate a family member’s 
organs upon death if provided with an incentive (reporting 18.7% in 2005 vs. 12.0% in 
1993).  Id. at 23. 
 40. Id. at 24 fig. 12 (“Financial Incentives and Deceased Organ Donation, 1993-2005”). 
 41. James R. Rodrigue et al., Attitudes Toward Financial Incentives, Donor Authorization, 
and Presumed Consent Among Next-of-Kin Who Consented vs. Refused Organ Donation, 81 
TRANSPLANTATION 1249, 1250-51 & tbl.1 (2006) (reporting the results of a telephone survey 
of 561 next-of-kin recently asked to consent to deceased donation of a family member’s 
organs: 348 donors and 213 non-donors). 
 42. Among next-of-kin donors, 84.5% (n = 294) reported that the incentives would make 
no difference, while 6% (21 / 344 = 6%) (n = 21) reported they would be more likely to 
donate, and 9.5% (33 / 348 = 9.5%) (n = 33) reported they would be less likely to donate.  
Id. at 1252 tbl.2. 
 43. For next-of-kin non-donors, 67.6% (n = 144) reported no effect, while 19.2% (41 / 
213 = 19.2%) (n = 41) reported they were more likely to donate, and 13.1% (28 / 213 = 
13.1%) (n = 28) indicated they would be even less likely to donate.  Id. at 1252 tbl.2. 
 44. Id. at 1254. 
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incentives.45  The Siminoff study did not attempt to measure whether the 
donors’ or non-donors’ decisions would have changed in light of donation, 
but did ask respondents whether they would have been offended/insulted by 
an offer to pay funeral expenses, and found a limited negative reaction on 
the part of next-of-kin respondents.46 
Three other studies compare the responses of registered organ donors 
to the general population and reach decidedly mixed results.  A 2001 study 
conducted by Dr. Cindy Bryce measured the response to specific programs 
providing financial benefits to the families of deceased donors.47  The 
majority of respondents reported that benefits would have no effect on 
them.48  For both registered organ donors and those not registered as 
donors, more respondents reported that financial incentives would increase 
the likelihood that they would donate than reported that financial incentives 
for their families would make them less likely to donate.49  Consistent with 
the general population studies referenced above,50 respondents were more 
comfortable with benefits which function more as reimbursements or as a 
means of offsetting the costs associated with the death of a loved one and 
 
 45. Laura A. Siminoff & Mary Beth Mercer, Public Policy, Public Opinion, and Consent for 
Organ Donation, 10 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 377, 377, 380 tbl.2 (2001) (reporting 
on a study of over 600 next-of-kin who had been asked to consent to organ donation from 
400 related acute care patients, and the attitudes of the respondents regarding three 
incentives to encourage kidney donation: (1) “[f]amilies who agree to donate should be given 
money to pay for funeral expenses” (31.6% agree); (2) “[p]eople who have signed a donor 
card should receive an organ transplant before others do” (25.4% agree); and (3) “[t]he 
government should provide money to families who agree to donate organs” (22.2% agree)). 
 46. In response to the funeral benefit, 25% of respondents indicated they would not have 
been offended/insulted.  Id. at 382 tbl.3 (“Families’ Attitudes about Funeral Expense 
Incentive).  20.3% mentioned that they "[w]ould have appreciated the offer,” and 23.8% 
indicated they would have been insulted.  Id.  Some respondents (16.9%) indicated a belief 
that other people might appreciate the offer.  Id.  A smaller percentage (17.4%) of the 
respondents—and perhaps an overlapping portion, although the study does not make this 
clear—indicated that “[o]rgan donation should not involve “the selling of organs or be a 
business transaction[.]”  Id.  8.7% reported that “[f]inancial help for funeral expenses should 
not be offered[.]”  Id. 
 47. C.L. Bryce et al., Do Incentives Matter? Providing Benefits to Families of Organ 
Donors, 5 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2999, 3000-01 (2005) (reporting on the attitudes of 971 
randomly sampled adults from Pennsylvania households asked to offer their opinions on 
incentives in general and to evaluate five specific programs on a 5-point Likert scale, ordered 
here from the most to least favorably received: (1) medical benefits; (2) funeral expenses; (3) 
travel lodging expenses; (4) charitable contributions; and (5) direct payment)). 
 48. Between seventy-one percent and seventy-six percent of respondents reported that 
benefits would have neither a positive nor negative effect, depending on the benefit.  Id. at 
3001. 
 49. Id. at 3001-02. 
 50. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text. 
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less comfortable with direct cash compensation.51  Still, even in the least 
favored category, direct payment, more respondents indicated an increased 
willingness to donate in light of financial incentives than indicated the 
opposite reaction.52  The study evidenced no indication that financial 
incentives were likely to result in a net loss in the supply of kidneys. 
The Bryce study measured the response to five types of posthumous 
benefits, ordered here from those which reported the largest net 
improvement in respondents’ attitudes toward donation to those that 
provided the smallest net improvement: medical expenses, funeral benefits, 
travel/lodging expenses, charitable contributions, and direct payment.53 
One noteworthy finding from the Bryce study is that respondents 
reported that others were much more likely to be affected by financial 
benefits than they themselves were.54  While the study is not conclusive on 
this pint, it would not be surprising if respondents underreported the 
influence of financial benefits on themselves out of a desire to appear 
altruistic, or a general discomfort with admitting to the effect of financial 
benefits on their willingness to donate.  If that were the case, then the higher 
estimated influence of financial benefits on others is more in line with actual 
effects we might see under an incentive system. 
A study by J.D. Jasper55 reported that while a small number of registered 
donors indicated they would not donate under specific incentive systems, the 
number of non-donors indicating they would donate if offered an incentive 
 
 51. Those indicating that the benefit would have an effect more frequently indicated an 
increased willingness to donate, measured by the percentage more willing to donate less the 
percentage less willing to donate.  Medical benefits reported the largest net increase, (twenty-
three percent), while even direct payment showed a net increase (nine percent) in the 
percentage of respondents more willing to donate over the percentage of respondents less 
willing to donate.  Bryce et al., supra note 47, at 3002.  A subset of the respondents identified 
themselves as registered organ donors, and they also reported an increase in their willingness 
to donate if incentives were introduced, although the direct cash incentive was less popular 
with registered donors to a degree that was statistically significant (fifty percent of registered 
donors registered support for the cash incentive, compared to fifty-six percent of non-donors 
(p = 0.004)).  Id. 
 52. Fifty-three percent in favor of direct payment vs. forty-two percent opposed.  Id. at 
3002 tbl.2 (“Respondents’ reaction to donor benefits”). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id.  For example, while seventeen percent of respondents indicated they were more 
likely to donate their own deceased family member’s organs when asked if direct payment 
were offered, and sixteen percent reported they were more likely to sign a donor card, fifty-
nine percent indicated that they thought it more likely that others would choose to donate if 
direct payment were offered.  Id. 
 55. Jasper et al., supra note 32, at 2182 (surveying respondents’ attitudes regarding the 
moral appropriateness of nine different incentives on a 7-point Likert “scale ranging from 1, 
‘completely inappropriate,’ to 7, ‘completely appropriate,’ with 4 being ‘neutral,’ and [also] to 
decide whether they would donate under each incentive policy if it were implemented.”). 
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was significantly higher than the number of donors indicating the 
converse.56  Registered donors favored the altruistic status quo, and a policy 
of donor recognition, while non-donors gave higher ratings to a cash 
payment and a lifetime of free driver’s licenses and car tags.57 
A focus group study directed by Thomas Peters reported a marked 
skepticism from nondonors regarding the organ allocation system, reflected 
in statements like “‘a wealthy person will get the kidney’; ‘it won’t be done 
equitably’; ‘you’ll be passed over’; or ‘you’re a minority.’”58 
One final study by Raymond and Patricia Horton compares the attitudes 
of the general public regarding incentives for organ donation to those of 
blood donors, finding that respondents who donated blood responded less 
favorably both to a generic compensation program and to priority on the 
organ waitlist.59  There is reason to think that the opinions of blood donors 
might better reflect the opinions of the population most likely to donate an 
organ, because at least one study has found a correlation between a 
willingness to donate blood and a willingness to register as a kidney 
donor.60 
The review of the attitudinal studies suggests two general conclusions.  
First, the only way to get a clear picture of whether and how financial 
 
 56. The smallest net increase in percentage of the respondent population indicating a 
change in donation plans was reported for the health insurance rebate, with twenty percent of 
donors indicating they would not donate, and forty percent of non-donors indicating they 
would donate, while the strongest net gain was reported in funeral expenses, with six percent 
of donors discouraged and forty-nine percent of non-donors encouraged.  Id. at 2183 tbl.4 
(“Percentages of Donors and Nondonors Indicating Whether They Would Donate Under Each 
Incentive Policy”).  Jasper et al. reported that “[i]f the difference between the two percentages 
is used to define effectiveness, then the most effective incentives would be [a] payment toward 
funeral expenses, donor recognition, and preferred status; the least effective would be [a] 
rebate on health insurance and [a] federal income tax credit.” Id. at 2183. 
 57. Id. at 2182-83. 
 58. Peters et al., supra note 32, at 2421.  A focus group was interviewed consisting of 
fifty-one registered donors and fifty-one nondonors.  Id. at 2420. 
 59. Horton & Horton, supra note 31, at 177-78.  In a study of 465 adults in an 
unspecified “local community,” 25.4% of respondents answer yes when asked “Do you think 
the family of a person who becomes an organ donor should receive any form of 
compensation?”, while 41.6% of respondents indicated a willingness to give organ donor 
card holders “preference in obtaining an organ for an organ transplant operation.”  Id. at 
177.  In contrast, respondents who had recently donated blood (n=217) reported lower 
favorability towards both types of incentives.  Only “16.5% endorsed any form of 
compensation,” while 20.9% favored preferential placement of donors on the waitlist.  Id. at 
177-78. 
 60. Philip K. T. Li et al., Attitudes About Organ and Tissue Donation Among the General 
Public and Blood Donors in Hong Kong, 11 PROGRESS IN TRANSPLANTATION 98, 99 & tbl.2 
(2001) (reporting that only twenty-two percent of randomly selected Hong Kong residents had 
signed organ donor cards, while forty-nine percent of blood donors had done so). 
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incentives would change the rate of kidney donation would be to conduct a 
pilot study.61  Second, that pilot study needs to be structured as a like-kind 
exchange or a non-direct benefit, instead of cash-for-kidney exchange, lest 
it run the risk of providing negligible results, or even discouraging altruistic 
donation.  As this article argues in Part III, infra, the public may perceive the 
proposed scholarship program as operating within the rhetoric of altruism, a 
suitable reciprocal gift provided in return for the donor-scholar’s “gift of life” 
to the recipient. 
C. Scholarship Incentives Would Improve the Logistics of Kidney Allocation 
Logistical factors have a measurable impact on the procurement of 
kidneys for transplantation.  While the proposed scholarship incentive that 
encourages living donation will not necessarily solve every logistical 
problem, it can mitigate the importance of two factors identified by Kieran 
Healy as critical inputs to the success of deceased donation: population 
density and the density of referring hospitals within the area of an Organ 
Procurement Organization (OPO).62 
One challenge facing the current allocation system is that in many areas 
there are geographical constraints on the efficient allocation of kidneys.  In 
areas where OPOs service large geographical areas, it is often infeasible for 
kidneys to be recovered from potential deceased donors or to get those 
kidneys to a recipient in need.  For example, LifeCenter Northwest Donor 
Network is an OPO that covers nearly all of Washington, Idaho, Montana 
and Alaska.63  Another factor that impacts the success of procurement of 
cadaveric kidneys is the availability of referring hospitals to communicate 
with OPOs in a short timeframe.64  While deceased donation requires a 
perfect convergence of circumstances, getting a serviceable kidney from a 
living donor is not a matter left to chance.  Because living donation does not 
require a fatal injury to the donor, it is less subject to random chance and 
fortuitous circumstances (such as the manner of the donor’s death).65  Living 
donation also relies on fewer intermediaries, and there are thus fewer 
 
 61. See, e.g., Bryce et al., supra note 47, at 2999 (describing how the empirical question 
of the impact of incentives on donation rates has been examined by various surveys, but how 
results have been inconsistent due to different methodologies and differing levels of specificity 
among the previous studies). 
 62. KIERAN HEALY, LAST BEST GIFTS: ALTRUISM AND THE MARKET FOR HUMAN BLOOD AND 
ORGANS 61-65 (2006). 
 63. Id. at 61. 
 64. Id. at 65.  “A 5 percentage point increase in the density of refer[ring hospitals] raises 
the procurement rate by about a three-quarters of a point.”  Id. 
 65. Indeed, the increased usage of safety features like motorcycle helmets and seatbelts 
reduces the supply of organs through deceased donation.  Lance Morrow, When One Body 
Can Save Another, TIME, June 17, 1991, at 56. 
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agents who can “drop the ball” in the process of getting a kidney from its 
procurement site to the recipient.  Indeed, with a living donor, the 
procurement site is the reception site—donor and recipient will undergo 
their respective procedures in the same facility.  Finally, living donation is a 
superior alternative to deceased donation, with superior patient and graft 
survival, and reduced morbidity as expected outcomes.66 
One final advantage of a scholarship incentive for living donation is that 
it would prevent the family of the donor from exercising veto power over the 
donor’s decision.  Advocates for deceased donation note that many viable 
organs are lost when the donor’s family is unwilling to follow through with 
the donor’s prior decision to donate his or her organs.67  When a living 
donor makes an informed decision to donate his or her organs, that choice 
is much more likely to be honored. 
D. The Scholarship Incentive Can Reduce the Incidence of Unhealthy 
Kidneys in the Procurement Chain 
A scholarship incentive that brings more living donations is likely to 
reduce the frequency with which recipients receive diseased kidneys.  The 
use of living donors reduces time pressures associated with procurement,68 
and is likely to improve the amount and reliability of information about a 
donor’s health. 
A lack of information about the donor can have fatal results.  For 
example, recently in Chicago, a deceased donor contracted the AIDS virus 
and hepatitis C shortly before death.  Initial tests did not reveal the recently-
acquired infections.  As a result, the donor’s organs infected four transplant 
recipients.69  The donor in question had admitted engaging in unspecified 
high-risk behaviors, and it is unclear whether the recipients were informed of 
the donor’s risky behaviors.  The current shortage of kidneys increases the 
risks created by limited information—while a recipient can choose to turn 
down an organ, there is no guarantee that another organ will become 
available.70  The compressed time frame of deceased donation exacerbates 
the problem—scientists are currently trying to extend the viability of kidneys 
 
 66. Jerry McCauley et al., General Medical Evaluation of the Living Donor, in LIVING 
DONOR TRANSPLANTATION 27, 27-28 (Henkie P. Tan et al. eds., 2007). 
 67. See Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's 
Organ Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 83 & n.60 (2004). 
 68. See infra notes 70-72. 
 69. Lindsey Tanner, Organ Donor Infects Four Patients with HIV, DAILY HERALD (Provo, 
Utah), Nov. 14, 2007, at www.heraldextra.com/content/view/243352/3 (last visited Apr. 9, 
2009). 
 70. Id. (reporting that while patients could reject a kidney because of concerns raised by a 
doctor, “the availability of organs is such that if you pass, there’s a possibility you won’t get 
one.”). 
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stored outside the body from three to six days,71 but the time within which a 
kidney must be placed in a solution to keep it viable can be as short as forty 
minutes.72  Had the Chicago donor been a living donor, the time pressure 
would have been less severe, and there likely would have been adequate 
time to run secondary tests on the donor.  While living donors can lie about 
their health risks, and some might, mandatory tests for infections like HIV 
and hepatitis can and should be part of the scholarship incentive program. 
Some have argued that live donation by compensated donors will 
increase incidence of diseased organs entering the procurement chain.73  
Richard Titmuss, in his seminal book The Gift Relationship, argued that 
markets in blood would not only drive out altruistic behavior, but would also 
contaminate the blood stream, because the poor, diseased, and drug 
ridden would be the only ones desperate enough to need the money, and 
thus the only parties willing to provide blood.74  Titmuss reached this 
conclusion by comparing the United States blood market of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s with the nonmarket donation system in the United 
Kingdom.  Titmuss’ book was so influential that the U.S. abandoned 
markets for blood in the mid-seventies, embracing an entirely altruistic 
system.75  What Titmuss did not predict was that the exclusively altruistic 
system exacerbated the problem of HIV-infected blood in the nation’s 
supply, because the altruistic system made the blood banks feel beholden to 
its donor population and unwilling to risk alienating them, even when 
evidence indicated that accepting donations from some donor groups 
presented an increased risk of contaminating the blood supply. 
When it first became evident in the early 1980’s that AIDS, a then-
unidentified contaminant, had started manifesting itself in the donated blood 
supply, both blood and plasma procurement industries made missteps that 
led to infections of those receiving blood transfusions.  Blood banks, which 
only accepted altruistic donations and thus were dependent on volunteers, 
 
 71. Michael Arndt, A Longer Shelf Life for Transplant Organs, BUS. WK., Oct. 21, 2002, 
at www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_42/c3804107.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 
2009). 
 72. See N.R. Brook & M.L. Nicholson, Kidney Transplantation from Non Heart-Beating 
Donors, 1 SURGEON: J. ROYAL C. SURGEONS EDINBURGH & IRELAND 311, 311 (2003) (noting 
that kidneys only remain viable for approximately forty minutes after cardiac arrest). 
 73. As one blogger speculated about kidney sales in the Philippines, “those who typically 
sell their kidneys aren’t the type of person who’d care that much about maintaining their 
health, nor do they have the ability to do so.”  Organ Trade in the Philippines: Signs of the 
Times?, http://health.tesstermulo.com/?p=376 (Oct. 4, 2007, 11:03 pm) (last visited Jan. 
16, 2009). 
 74. See RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL 
POLICY 75-76 (Vintage Books 1972) (1971) (positing that the treatment of blood as a market 
good leads drug addicts, alcoholics, and carriers of diseases to donate). 
 75. HEALY, supra note 62, at 89. 
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were afraid of alienating homosexual populations—which as a group 
donated blood well above the national average—realizing that doing so 
was likely to result in a shortage of available blood.  Thus, the blood banks 
did not start screening donors, instead interpreting as inconclusive data that 
suggested that homosexual populations were at higher risk of contracting 
and communicating AIDS.76  Conversely, plasma banks, which paid for their 
product, did not feel beholden to donor groups and screened donors once 
the AIDS issue came to light, but miscalculated the risk of leaving older 
supplies of plasma on the market.77 
Unlike blood supply, kidney donation occurs on a smaller scale, and 
each living donor can be tested for infections that put the recipient at risk.  
Some may be concerned about a testing program violating the privacy of 
individual donors.78  However, the scholarship incentive program can be 
structured so that information revealed during testing is kept private from 
those parties not directly involved with the procurement or transplantation 
processes.  While there may be populations that are less likely to qualify for 
a kidney scholarship, that determination will not need to be made based on 
stereotyping or questions about certain risk-increasing behaviors that are 
also associated with certain lifestyle choices.  Instead, careful tests can verify 
when a donor’s kidney will present a risk to a recipient and therefore must 
be kept out of the procurement chain.  Finally, there is a statutory 
requirement to prevent “the acquisition of organs that are infected with the 
etiologic agent for acquired immune deficiency syndrome.”79  Carefully 
testing living donors before donation should assist in meeting that goal.  
Contrary to the fears of Titmuss and those who have embraced his research, 
a market in organs will not necessarily lead to widespread contamination, 
and may actually decrease the incidence of diseased organs in the 
transplant chain. 
E. Unequal Distribution Across Racial Groups 
If a scholarship program could effectively reduce the waitlist to zero and 
provide kidneys for every patient that evidences medical need, then it would 
successfully deal with one of the major problems in the current organ 
 
 76. Id. at 98-103. 
 77. Id. at 103-06. 
 78. See Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old 
Responses to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1994) (explaining that some parties 
take privacy seriously in order to protect themselves from having potential embarrassing 
information being exposed to society). 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(E) (2000). 
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allocation system: disparities in allocation across racial categories.80  These 
disparities are due in part to the method used to match kidneys to 
recipients81 and in part to the actual discrimination that creeps into the 
process of admitting prospective recipients onto the waitlists in the first 
instance.82 
It is not safe to assume, however, that the proposed scholarship 
program would effectively reduce the waiting list to zero and then maintain 
a perfect balance between donors and recipients.  It is more likely that either 
the scholarship system procures more kidneys, but not enough to clear out 
the waiting lists, or that if the incentive is particularly effective, there will be 
more donors waiting to qualify for the scholarship than there are recipients 
waiting for kidneys.  In either case, the scholarship incentive must deal with 
the same difficult question: how to correct the racial disparity that exists in 
the current organ allocation regime? 
There are significant risks inherent in upsetting the current allocative 
apple cart.  One of the key findings by Kieran Healy is that the practices of 
and economic investments by OPOs have a significant impact on the 
success of providing kidneys for needy recipients.83  Unless the scholarship 
program can guarantee that living donors will completely supplant 
deceased donors, any new policy has to protect the efficient aspects of the 
current procurement system. 
Currently, kidney procurement is handled by fifty-nine OPOs84 grouped 
into eleven regions.  Some OPOs are net importers of organs, and others 
are net exporters.  Each OPO gets to set allocation rules within its service 
 
 80. GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS, supra note 2, at 96 (stating that “[w]ith regard to kidney 
transplantation, the waiting time for Black Americans is 74% longer than for Whites.”). 
 81. Michele Goodwin, Altruism’s Limits: Law, Capacity, and Organ Commodification, 56 
RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 353-56 (2004) [hereinafter Goodwin, Altruism’s Limits].  The end result 
of UNOS’s method of matching antigens in patients has a net effect of leaving Blacks on the 
waitlist for a longer period of time.  See id. at 354.  This is in part because matching antigens 
are rarer among Blacks than Whites, and partly because Blacks have a higher rate of 
sensitivity to donor antigens regardless of donor race.  Id. 
 82. GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS, supra note 2, at 90-96 (discussing evidence of “green 
screening” and racial stereotyping that prevents some prospective recipients from being added 
to waitlists in the first instance). 
 83. HEALY, supra note 62, at 66-67.  According to Healy, “[d]onation . . . is also strongly 
affected by the resources and scope of the procurement agency. . . .  [T]he individual capacity 
for altruism and the social organization of procurement are not separate questions but rather 
two aspects of the same process. . . . [O]rganizations create ‘contexts for giving’ [and] . . . 
help create their own donor pool.”  Id. 
 84. Nat’l Kidney Found., 25 Facts About Organ Donation and Transplantation, at 
www.kidney.org/news/newsroom/fs_new/25factsorgdon&trans.cfm (last visited Apr. 9, 2009). 
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area.85  While the Department of Health and Human Services has tried to 
shift to a national allocation system, organs are primarily shared within 
regional boundaries, in part due to the time pressures imposed by relying 
predominantly on deceased donation.86  Kidneys are not allocated based 
on who was first-in-time on the waiting list, but generally to the recipient 
whose blood antigens best match those of the donor.87  Matching is based 
on six specific human leukocyte antigens (HLAs), and where a donor and a 
prospective recipient are a perfect match, an OPO is bound by rules crafted 
by UNOS to provide the kidney to that recipient.88  Otherwise, the OPO 
decides how to allocate kidneys within its area. 
Given the importance of maintaining an infrastructure to process 
donated organs, at first glance it seems reasonable to match scholarships 
with OPOs.  For example, if OPO #1 has 1,200 prospective recipients 
waiting for kidneys, then 1,200 scholarships would be provided through 
OPO #1.  OPO #1 would conduct tests and make sure each donated 
organ is a healthy match for a recipient from its area.  If there were no 
matches in the area, the OPO could then match the organ with a recipient 
in its region or perhaps nationwide.  In theory, tying the benefits of kidney 
donation to the need in the community could be the most efficient way of 
dealing with concerns about uneven distribution of kidneys.  However, given 
the racial inequities in the current procurement system, there is good reason 
to think that administering the scholarship program through OPOs in the 
same way that they have managed non-market donations will lead to 
shorter lists, but with the same allocative inequities.  Blacks may wait a 
shorter time because of the increased number of kidneys available, but they 
will still wait twice as long as White recipients.89 
A second option which would capitalize on pre-existing administrative 
capacity would be to manage scholarships by state, and let the state 
legislatures handle the allocative details.  As of May 1, 2009, 1,274 
potential recipients are waiting for kidneys in the state of Washington.90  
 
 85. Jeffrey Prottas, The Politics of Transplantation, in ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION: 
ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES 9 (Bethany Spielman ed., 1996). 
 86. The time available to get a kidney into a solution necessary to keep it viable can be 
as short as forty minutes.  Brook & Nicholson, supra note 72, at 311. 
 87. See, e.g., Ian Ayres et al., Unequal Racial Access to Kidney Transplantation, 46 VAND. 
L. REV. 805, 819-20 (1993) (explaining how recipients receive kidneys according to the quality 
of the antigen match). 
 88. Prottas, supra note 85, at 13. 
 89. GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS, supra note 2, at 45 (reporting that in 2003, Blacks waited 
an average of 1,891 days compared to 840 days for Whites). 
 90. THE ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, CURRENT U.S. WAITING 
LIST OVERALL BY ORGAN, at www.optn.org/latestData/step2.asp? (select “Waiting List” then 
“Organ by State”) (last visited May 11, 2009). 
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Donors could be matched to recipients by geographical proximity to one of 
the state’s five transplant centers, and scholarships for donors could fund 
studies at state-run colleges and universities.  Because state legislatures are 
elected bodies, it is possible that they would be more sensitive to concerns 
about racial equality, and that they might put some pressure on the 
inequities created by the current system of allocation. 
Another option might be to match donors and recipients by race: if 
30,000 Blacks are waiting for kidneys, then 30,000 kidney scholarships 
should be made available to Blacks.91  This might address the racism in 
current distribution methods.  This solution, however, might also run afoul of 
recent Supreme Court decisions arguing for race neutral application 
processes for high schools and undergraduate institutions.92  The Court has 
taken the stance that the only way to prevent discrimination based on race is 
to stop discriminating based on race.93  Thus, a program that preferences 
Black applicants over other applicants could be found to be a violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
One method of avoiding that problem would be by providing 
scholarships only for graduate level and professional programs, for example 
law and medical degrees.  The Supreme Court held that while it was 
unconstitutional to use race-based factors to select applicants for an 
undergraduate program,94 it was constitutional to use race-based factors to 
select entrants in a professional program because maintaining a diverse 
student body had an inherent educative value and was “essential to its 
educational mission.”95  However, there may not be enough supply of 
donors who are qualified to go into law, business, and medicine sufficient to 
meet the need for donated kidneys.96 
 
 91. This would address the current disparity of need—the neediest population for organs 
could be served by the (arguably) neediest population in terms of education.  Goodwin, 
Altruism’s Limits, supra note 81, at 357; see also NICOLE STOOPS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at 3 tbl.A (2004), available at 
www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-550.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (noting that Blacks 
have a lower percentage than other racial groups of individuals who receive a bachelor’s 
degree or more). 
 92. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) 
(barring race-based regimes for allocating students to high schools); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (finding that a program which favored “underrepresented minority” 
applicants solely because of race was not narrowly tailored to achieve an interest in 
educational diversity). 
 93. Seattle Sch., 555 U.S. 701. 
 94. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270, 275. 
 95. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329, 343 (2003). 
 96. A recent article notes that law school applicants dropped to 83,500 from 98,700 in 
2006, and medical school applicants from 46,080 in 1997 to 42,000.  Alex Williams, The 
Falling-Down Professions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2008, at www.nytimes.com/2008/01/ 
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Perhaps the scholarship incentive program would be best served by 
facing the constitutional question head on.  A suit over unconstitutional 
scholarship distribution could bring concerns about racial inequities in 
kidney allocation to the fore, and perhaps lead to changes in the legal 
structure for kidney markets.  Indeed, if the race-based admission process 
for the proposed scholarship program is invalidated as a violation of the 
Equal Protection clause, a racially-discriminatory admission process for 
kidney waitlists should also be held to violate the Equal Protection clause.97 
There are two further risks associated with lining up donors and 
recipients along racial lines.  First, not every donor or recipient will 
automatically self-identify as a member of a particular ethnicity.  Individuals 
should not be shoehorned into one racial group or another to qualify for 
consideration under the scholarship program.  In addition, as discussed in 
Part II.B, supra, some evidence indicates that Blacks are less likely to 
donate, and systems of commodification are less likely to make a positive 
net impact in their willingness to donate.  If Blacks continue to be 
underrepresented in donor populations but overrepresented on waitlists, 
then a system matching donor to recipients by race will still result in Black 
recipients waiting a disproportionate amount of time to receive a kidney. 
One common theme in accounts of lower donation rates among Blacks 
is the notion that they distrust the current allocation system.98  Blacks are 
more likely to express the belief that persons of color will not get access to 
donated kidneys, and thus, that their donations are less likely to have a 
 
06/fashion/06professions.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=the%20falling%20down%20professions&st
=cse (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).  For example, in the 2005-2006 academic year, the 195 
ABA certified law schools granted only 43,883 juris doctorate degrees.  American Bar 
Association, JD. and LL.B Degrees Awarded, available at www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/ 
charts/stats%20-%207.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2009). 
 97. “Although all governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are 
invalidated by it.  As we have explained, ‘whenever the government treats any person 
unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely 
within the language and spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection.’” Grutter, 
539 U.S. at 326-27 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 229-30 
(1995)). 
 98. See GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS, supra note 2, at 49 (reporting the findings of a study 
conducted among African Americans in 2003 which reported high levels of distrust regarding 
organ donation); see also HEALY, supra note 62, at 61 (summarizing research that reports 
high levels of distrust for the donation process among Blacks, and that OPOs with higher 
concentrations of Blacks within their boundaries have measurably lower levels of 
procurement); see also Laura A. Siminoff & Christina M. Saunders Sturm, African-American 
Reluctance to Donate: Beliefs and Attitudes About Organ Donation and Implications for Policy, 
10 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 59, 63 tbl.1 (2000) (reporting that 40.0% of African-American 
respondents agree that “[t]he way it’s decided who gets an organ is unfair”, compared with 
30.7% of White respondents who agreed). 
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positive impact in their own communities.  Surveys comparing Black and 
White respondents report that Black respondents are more likely to believe 
that if a doctor knows a patient is an organ donor, the doctor will not do as 
much to save the patient’s life.99  A scholarship system designed to recruit 
Black donors with credible assurances of fair allocation could potentially 
alter expectations about the procurement system and create a shift in 
donating patterns, thus ameliorating some of the concerns noted above.100 
The next three Parts of this article identify three specific obstacles to the 
scholarship proposal, and argue that in each case the scholarship incentive 
fills the gap between the poles of unfettered commodification and exclusive 
altruism.  Part III responds to concerns about the rhetorical importance of 
altruistic language and meaning in the kidney procurement regime.  Part IV 
identifies the potential coercive and exploitive dangers presented by systems 
of commodification, and explains through appeals to heuristics and brain 
morphology how the proposed scholarship incentive reduces coercive and 
exploitive pressures.  Part V identifies the current statutory obstacles to any 
incentive system and suggests innovative ways to work within the meaning of 
the statute to create room for pilot programs like the proposed scholarship 
incentive. 
III.  SCHOLARSHIP INCENTIVES PRESERVE THE LANGUAGE AND RHETORIC OF 
ALTRUISM 
In order to rise to Professor Goodwin’s challenge to determine the 
appropriate level of commodification,101 it is necessary to deal with the 
competing rhetoric of exclusive altruism versus unrestricted commodification 
and look for possible common ground between the two.102  As the 
anthropologist Donald Joralemon explains, both poles of the debate 
operate like the rhetorical equivalent of the anti-rejection drugs.103  Briefly, 
in order to keep the transplant recipient’s body from rejecting a new organ, 
the recipient must take certain drugs that limit immune responses.  
 
 99. Id. (reporting that 37.9% of African-American respondents and 21.2% of White 
respondents agree with the following statement: “I worry that if the doctors know that I am an 
organ donor, they won’t do as much to save my life.”). 
 100. Nevin Gewertz & Michele Goodwin, Rethinking Colorblind State Action: A Thought 
Experiment on Racial Preferences (manuscript at 28, on file with the author). 
es (manuscript at 28, on file with the author). 
 101. Goodwin, Private Ordering, supra note 6, at 1369, 1384. 
 102. See, e.g., Peter Singer, Freedoms and Utilities in the Distribution of Health Care, in 
MARKETS AND MORALS 149, 163-64 (Gerald Dworkin et al. eds., 1977) (discussing both the 
positive and negative outcomes of commodification and altruism in the blood donation 
industry). 
 103. See Donald Joralemon, Organ Wars: The Battle for Body Parts, 9 MED. 
ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 335, 348 (1995). 
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Rhetorical structures are designed to make palatable, then acceptable, 
finally noble, the somewhat frightening reality of removing an organ from 
one human being’s body and placing it within the body of another.  Medical 
professionals have overwhelmingly chosen to present the procurement of 
kidneys for transplantation and its attendant medical realities as a gift, 
appealing to the rhetoric of altruism to suppress a potentially negative social 
reaction.  The language of the National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) 
and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA)—and their criminal 
sanctions—strengthen that commitment to altruistic rhetoric.104  As a 
practical matter, it is dangerous to even suggest stepping outside of the 
altruistic regime in the process of arranging a kidney transplant.105  Likewise, 
the choice of some advocates of incentive programs to couch their 
arguments in terms of autonomy instead of market forces or efficiency106 
appears to be a conscious choice to shape the debate in a fashion that 
makes their position more acceptable to those who might mistrust markets, 
 
 104. National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), 42 U.S.C. § 274e(b) (2000) (stating “[a]ny 
person who violates [NOTA] . . . shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not 
more than five years, or both.”); REV. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 16(a) (revised 2006) 
(stating “a person that for valuable consideration knowingly purchases or sells a part for 
transplantation or therapy . . . is subject to a fine . . . or imprisonment); see Michael H. 
Shapiro, Regulation as Language: Communicating Values by Altering the Contingencies of 
Choice, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 681, 687 (1994) (arguing that if regulatory systems reinforce or 
attenuate “certain preferences, attitudes, beliefs and dispositions,” then it is crucial to 
recognize that regulation communicates “basic societal ideas.”); see generally JAMES BOYD 
WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 203 (1985) 
(discussing how criminal law creates a system of rhetoric of meaning which defines the roles 
and starting points of the various actors in the system); JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE 
THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND 
COMMUNITY 245 (1984) (arguing that treaties and constitutions set a baseline for the 
conversations that we can have about the law and the roles of the various actors within it, 
“alter[ing] the rhetorical conditions of life for those in whose name they are promulgated and 
those to whom they speak.”). 
 105. One can witness this effect at matchingdonors.com, a website that provides a forum 
for needy potential recipients to solicit willing altruist donors.  The website warns, “[i]t is 
absolutely against the law to have any financial benefit from organ donation.  If you are paid, 
or request to be paid, for any transplant you will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.  
Violators of this criminal prohibition, can be subject to $50,000 fines and/or five years of 
imprisonmement [sic].  Our terms allow us to give all of your personal, contact and tracking 
information to the FBI without your permission if you violate this prohibition.”  
MatchingDonors.com, Potential Organ Donor Login, at www.matchingdonors.com/life/ 
Donor/index.cfm?page=login&requested=desktop.cfm?&string=page=main (last visited Apr. 
9, 2009). 
 106. See, e.g., Sally L. Satel & Benjamin E. Hippen, When Altruism Is Not Enough: The 
Worsening Organ Shortage and What It Means for the Elderly, 15 ELDER L.J. 153, 198 (2007) 
(“Paradoxically, the current system based on altruism-or-else undermines the respect for 
individual autonomy that is at the heart of the most widely held values in bioethics.”). 
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but embrace concepts of human dignity and liberty.  Joralemon, however, 
postulates that successfully “suppressing the cultural rejection” of 
transplantation might require “some combination of supporting ideologies, 
some blend of gift and market rhetoric and policy.”107  His intuition is 
echoed by modern scholars.108  The proposed scholarship incentive 
possesses just such a potential to preserve a rhetorical middle ground 
between the current regime of unrewarded gifting and the oft-advocated 
corrective of unrestrained commodification. 
Historically, the debate over kidney shortages has taken place at the 
poles.  Some of the opposition to commodification-oriented solutions stems 
from a desire to protect exclusively altruistic donation because it is 
understood to perform important rhetorical functions.  Indeed, altruism 
purists raise several salient concerns about commodification.  First and 
foremost, altruism purists are concerned that altruism is too fragile to 
withstand the encroachment of a market for kidneys.109  Thus, the argument 
goes, any commodification runs the risk of triggering a net loss of kidneys 
available for transplantation, because donors responding to altruistic urges 
will be disgusted by and turn away from donation once market forces take 
hold.  In addition, altruism purists argue that the sale of organs sends the 
wrong message about the sanctity of human life and human bodies.110  
 
 107. Joralemon, supra note 103, at 348.  Ethicist Suzanne Holland recognizes that “how 
we think of things, the conceptual framework that we use, in large measure shapes what we 
do with those things.”  Suzanne Holland, Contested Commodities at Both Ends of Life: Buying 
and Selling Gametes, Embryos, and Body Tissues, 11 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 263, 273 
(2001).  But Holland views the conceptual framework as fundamentally dichotomous.  She 
argues that “[i]f we think of the body as a fungible entity, we are more likely to be comfortable 
with a market that exchanges it for other fungible entities—e.g., body tissues traded off for 
collagen treatments.  If, on the other hand, we think of the body as inalienable, we will not 
want to subject it to the vicissitudes of the market.”  Id. at 274. 
 108. See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market?  A New and 
Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 51-52 (2003) (endeavoring to find a 
middle ground between what sociologist Viviana Zelizer calls Radin’s “Hostile Worlds” view of 
commodification with Posner’s “Nothing But” advocacy of commodification to advocate for 
partially commodified family structures where commodification creates “Differentiated Ties,” 
improving connections and increasing affection through commodification, not in spite of it) 
(citing Viviana A. Zelizer, The Purchase of Intimacy, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 817, 818-19, 
826 (2000)). 
 109. See Singer, supra note 102, at 163-64.  Singer argues that what is threatened by the 
commodification of goods like blood—and by analogy, kidneys—is “the right to give 
something that cannot be bought, that has no cash value, and must be given freely if it is to 
be obtained at all.  This right . . . really is incompatible with the freedom to sell, and we 
cannot avoid denying one of these freedoms when we grant the other.”  Id. 
 110. See Carson Holloway, Monetary Incentives for Organ Donation: Practical and Ethical 
Concerns, in ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES 152 (Bethany 
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They also assert that even if the commodification of body parts itself did not 
destroy altruistic giving, it would provide the grounds for a rapid slide down 
a slippery slope.  There is a fear that ceding any ground to market forces 
cedes the battle en toto.  Soon, other forms of bodily commodification—
e.g., slavery, baby selling, or doctor assisted suicide with an associated sale 
of salvageable organs—would become the norm, and altruistic systems 
would become the outlier, more difficult to conceptualize or implement.111 
Some will argue that the scholarship incentive program is flawed from 
the outset.  Critics will undoubtedly find something morally repugnant about 
the suggestion that those who might not otherwise be able to afford college 
should be required to give up a kidney to access educational opportunities.  
I cannot disagree with the core sentiment expressed in that concern.  The 
scholarship incentive would certainly be undesirable in an ideal world where 
everyone who desired might obtain a college degree, regardless of financial 
limitations.  Unfortunately, this is not the world in which we live.  As 
Margaret Radin recognized, there is value in striving toward ideal justice, 
which in the ideal world will “avoid all significant harms to personhood and 
community”.112  However, in this world, conditions are not ideal, and we are 
often forced to select the best alternative of those available, instead of the 
ideal.113  There would be no reason to propose the scholarship incentive to 
address the shortage of kidneys if the populace was sufficiently motivated to 
engage in unrewarded giving.114  There would also be no reason to worry 
that a system of commodification would exploit the poor if there were not 
people whose circumstances made the inconvenience and risk of donating a 
kidney well worth the compensation they would receive in a hypothetical 
unrestricted market.  But the proposed scholarship incentive is conceived 
 
Spielman ed., 1996) (explaining the belief that commodification of the human body degrades 
the human person). 
 111. Margaret Radin describes this as the “domino theory” of commodification, which 
assumes that “anytime we find market and nonmarket understandings coexisting, . . . it is 
inevitable that the market understanding will win out.”  MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED 
COMMODITIES 103 (1996).  Thus, for subscribers to the domino theory, to entertain any notion 
of commodification is to admit defeat and to allow the barbaric rhetoric of the market to storm 
the gates.  Radin finds the “domino theory” too simplistic, stating that “it concedes too much 
to commodification to argue that certain specific items (for example, blood) must remain 
completely noncommodified so as to keep open opportunities for altruism[.]”  Id. at 107.  She 
argues instead that “[t]he way to a less commodified society is to see and foster the nonmarket 
aspect of much of what we buy and sell, to honor our internally plural understandings, rather 
than to erect a wall to keep a certain few things completely off the market and abandon 
everything else to market rationality.” Id. 
 112. Id. at 123. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See generally supra Part II.A. 
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with an eye toward “society as it is.”115  This article presupposes that it is not 
“responsible to allow some to die on the outside chance that someone will 
be touched by the spirit of generosity . . . merely to preserve one of many 
possible avenues for the expression of [that] generosity.”116  Turning 
exclusively to altruism to remedy the shortfall in transplantable organs 
cannot be justified on the basis of its effectiveness, because it falls far short 
of current and projected need.  However, altruism purists have suggested 
that such exclusivity is rhetorically necessary to preserve organ donation. 
This Part responds to these concerns by arguing that the proposed 
scholarship incentive fits within the rhetorical sphere of altruistic giving, 
having the potential to preserve the rhetoric of altruism while simultaneously 
providing incentives to increase donation.117  The scholarship incentive 
aspires to secure a sufficient number of organs in a fashion that is not 
hostile to ethical traditions, and which protects individuals from coercion 
and exploitation better than a system of outright commodification would.  
The scholarship incentive is envisioned as a means of maintaining the 
rhetoric of altruism, and protecting the concept of donation as reciprocal 
gifting, where donor and recipient both receive and give.  The donor gives 
of herself physically, and the recipient gets a likely increase of both the 
duration and quality of life.  The recipient, mostly through the mechanisms 
of insurance (private or government) gives the donor an educational benefit 
that provides a likely increase to the donor’s quality of life, and perhaps life 
expectancy as well.118  In important ways, the kidney donor as scholarship 
 
 115. Arthur J. Matas et al., A Proposal for Cadaver Organ Procurement: Routine Removal 
with Right of Informed Refusal, 10 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 231, 242 (1985). 
 116. Id. 
 117. But see Evans, supra note 33, at 1019-20, 1022 (reporting on a pilot study regarding 
incentives for deceased organ donation where respondents balanced a $25,000 voucher for 
hospital costs against the mounting debt a hypothetical family faced to keep a family member 
on life support, but did not balance a $25,000 cash incentive or a $2,000 voucher for 
funeral expenses against the mounting debt).  Evans concluded that “a medical bill voucher is 
considered to be in the same sphere as the medical bill, and these two variables can therefore 
be commensurated.  However, equating the surgical removal of organs with an object outside 
of the medical sphere—such as the college education the family could buy with the $25,000 
hypothetical payment—violates our sense of the sacredness of these institutional boundaries.  
Pure commodification of organs—with fungibility outside of the medical sphere—is therefore 
not engaged in by the respondents.  The more limited commodification from medical 
vouchers, where they are used as money internal to the medical sphere, is.”  Id. at 1022 
(internal citation omitted). 
 118. One Japanese study found a measurable correlation between educational attainment 
and life expectancy.  Yoshihisa Fujino et al., A Nationwide Cohort Study of Educational 
Background and Major Causes of Death Among the Elderly Population in Japan, 40 
PREVENTIVE MED. 444, 446 (2005). 
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recipient sustains the rhetoric of gift that is essential to preserving a workable 
social conception of kidney procurement. 
A. The Rhetoric of the Gift 
Those opposed to increasing organ donation through an open market 
are also suspicious of restricted regimes of commodification.  While 
proponents of such restricted regimes call them “rewarded gifting”,119 others 
see rewarded gifting as “a terminological subterfuge meant to [obscure] the 
real issue” of kidney donation.120  The anthropologist Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney 
suggests that the gift metaphor disguises “a transaction completely devoid of 
social relationships,” a market wolf draped in the wool of altruism.121  
However, viewing kidney procurement through an exclusively donative lens 
is also a terminological subterfuge,122 recognized even by those who are 
opposed to market-based solutions.123  Organ donation as gift is entirely 
illusory rhetoric, insomuch as it applies to actors in the system other than the 
donor herself.  The sociologist Kieran Healy speaks of the current model of 
kidney donation as a deliberate attempt to preserve the concept of the gift, 
even though the reality of kidney donation is that it requires a coordinated 
allocation market to make sure the donated kidney gets from the donor to 
 
 119. See Daar, supra note 7, at 182. 
 120. B.N. Colabawalla, Letter to the Editor, High Mortality Among Recipients of Bought 
Living-Unrelated Donor Kidneys, 336 LANCET 1194 (1990).  Holland echoes that sentiment, 
suggesting that overt commodification would be preferable to the current regime of altruistic 
donation, where the gift of “[a] donated embryo—or body tissue” generates market profit for 
those who use and research donated embryos.  Holland, supra note 107, at 280. 
 121. Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, Brain Death and Organ Transplantation: Cultural Bases of 
Medical Technology, 35 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 233, 241 (1994).  “[D]onated organs—
‘the gift of self,’ literally—are not and cannot be the gift of self because organ donation lacks 
the most critical element of gift giving and exchange: social relationship. . . .  Without the 
social context in which real social agents engage in a transaction, the organ . . . becomes a 
candidate for commoditization.”  Id. 
 122. See Joralemon, supra note 103, at 336 (describing the gift rhetoric of organ 
procurement as analogous to anti-rejection drugs).  Joralemon argues that by packaging 
organ donation into gift rhetoric, we inhibit cultural rejection of transplantation and its views of 
the body.  Id.  “What I am arguing is that, at least for the present and near future, the cultural 
success of transplantation will be measured by how effectively its supporting ideology 
suppresses, rather than replaces, traditional concepts of bodily integrity . . . .  This is the 
standard by which to judge the likely outcome of the conflict between gift and property rights’ 
advocates.”  Id. at 347. 
 123. Heléna Ragoné, The Gift of Life: Surrogate Motherhood, Gamete Donation, and 
Constructions of Altruism, in TRANSFORMATIVE MOTHERHOOD: ON GIVING AND GETTING IN A 
CONSUMER CULTURE 65, 65-66 (Linda L. Layne ed., 1999) (suggesting that gift rhetoric has 
been “lavishly applied” to blood and organ donation in “an attempt by participants and by 
society to retard, at least symbolically, the trend toward the commodification of life.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
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the recipient.124  Recipients of kidneys either pay out of pocket or turn to 
private or public insurance to purchase kidneys from procurement agencies, 
which generate income by arranging transplants.125  Doctors who perform 
transplants are never asked to donate their services because of a concern 
that to do otherwise would corrupt the process.  Only the donor is treated as 
potentially subject to corruption via commodification.126 
Nevertheless, transplant service providers are so wedded to gift 
language that they are uncomfortable with donors who evidence anything 
other than pure altruistic motives.  For example, in one highly publicized 
case, a hospital in Toronto rejected a donor who was, in their estimation, 
“motivated by [a] desire for publicity . . . not by altruism.”127  This rejection 
reflects the current perspective of the transplantation community which 
accepts living donations from nondirected donors (i.e., donors not related to 
or solicited by the recipient) only when their motives are “good” and their 
mental health is “balanced.”  Nondirected donors who seem overly 
interested in media coverage are not only viewed to pose a threat to the 
anonymity and privacy of the donor, but also a risk that their decision to 
donate might be animated by misguided motives.128 
 
 124. See HEALY, supra note 62, at 70 (explaining how organ donation and blood donation 
are the best examples of altruistic behavior and both have the symbolic resemblance of an 
anonymous gift). 
 125. Mark Katches et al., Donors Don't Realize They Are Fueling a Lucrative Industry, 
ORANGE COUNTY REG., Apr. 16, 2000, at 1, at www.ocregister.com/features/body/day1.shtml 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (“Companies and tissue banks step around the law by charging 
marked-up fees to handle and process the body parts.  They avoid billing for the tissue itself.  
The law allows for reasonable fees to cover processing costs without defining reasonable.  
Tissue banks also avoid using the word ‘sales.’ But Judy Perkins, executive director of the 
University of California, San Diego, Regional Tissue Bank, calls fees a euphemism for sales.”). 
 126. Often, however, those who donate organs or gametes do not realize that they are 
contributing to a system rife with commodification.  See, e.g., Holland, supra note 107, at 
264 (“On hearing of such cases, people often feel ‘cheated,’ duped, conflicted, and even 
angry.  As one woman said, ‘I thought I was donating to a nonprofit.  I didn't know I was 
lining someone's pocket. . . . It makes me angry.  It makes me appalled.  If it's not illegal, it 
ought to be.  It's certainly immoral.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 127. Laura Meckler, For Religious Group, True Charity Begins on Operating Table, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 13, 2007, at A1. 
 128. See M.A. Dew et al., Guidelines for the Psychosocial Evaluation of Living Unrelated 
Kidney Donors in the United States, 7 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1047, 1049 & tbl.2 (2007) 
(noting a higher risk for donors whose motives reflect a desire for recognition such as a desire 
for publicity or a desire for a personal relationship); Patricia L. Adams et al., The Nondirected 
Live-Kidney Donor: Ethical Considerations and Practice Guidelines: A National Conference 
Report, 74 TRANSPLANTATION 582, 587 (2002) (reporting at a national conference of the 
transplantation community that a nondirected donor “who seems overly interested in media 
coverage should not be accepted because of the potential impact of media coverage on the 
recipient’s anonymity and privacy.”). 
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This tension is manifest even in concerns about an OPO’s own media 
communications regarding transplantation.129  OPOs are conflicted about 
using the gift of a nondirected donor for PR purposes, even though one 
journalist characterized such a PR photo as “a big thing for the hospital, to 
have a stranger donate his kidney . . . .”130  For example, Chaya Lipschutz, 
a self-appointed kidney matchmaker, draws suspicion from hospitals in part 
because “she does offer the promise that ‘if you donate, people will think 
the world of you, you’ll feel gratified, it’ll boost your self esteem,’ an 
expectation of quid pro quo which might horrify a professional transplant 
coordinator.  Frankly, some hospitals are wary of Chaya, and won’t deal 
with her.”131 
One of the key factors OPOs look for in conducting the psychological 
screening of nondirected donors is that they have evidenced a commitment 
to altruism in other areas of their lives.132  It is interesting to note that this 
rhetorical commitment to pure altruism does not fully translate into other 
areas where products of the body are at least incompletely commodified: 
sperm, eggs, plasma and surrogate motherhood. 
When comparing organ donation with the donation of other body 
products which are commodified, there is reason to think that the rhetoric of 
gift as applied to body parts is merely that: rhetoric.  Sperm or egg “donors” 
actually sell the products of their body to “recipients” who purchase them (or 
who have insurance that purchases them).  These “donors” and “recipients” 
of gametes frequently invest themselves in a rhetorical structure that allows 
them to emphasize the social benefit of the transfer of gametes while 
downplaying the financial realities of the transaction.133  As Martha Ertman 
has articulated, donors and recipients operate within an open market134—
even the mediator’s title of “sperm bank” clearly belies the rhetoric of gift 
 
 129. Id.  “[T]he OPO must be cautious in educational brochures that show photos of the 
[nondirected donor] and recipient together, implying that such a meeting is commonplace 
after the transplant.”  Id. 
 130. This American Life: #347 Matchmakers, 30:09 (Chicago Public Radio broadcast Jan. 
18, 2008). 
 131. Id. at 26:08. 
 132. See, e.g., L. Wright et al., Living Anonymous Liver Donation: Case Report and Ethical 
Justification, 7 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1032, 1033-34 (2007) (“The donor had performed 
various conventional acts of altruism such as blood donation and community service, was on 
a bone marrow registry and had a signed organ donor card.  We viewed these as sufficient 
evidence that his primary motive for liver donation was similarly grounded in altruism.”). 
 133. Ertman, supra note 108, at 17.  See Katches et al., supra note 125 (“A typical donor 
produces $14,000 to $34,000 in sales for the nonprofits, records and interviews show.  But 
yields can be far greater.  Skin, tendons, heart valves, veins and corneas are listed at about 
$110,000.  Add bone from the same body, and one cadaver can be worth about 
$220,000.”). 
 134. Ertman, supra note 108, at 15-16. 
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which attempts to inoculate society against the jarring dissonance of the 
commodification of body parts.135 
B. The Mythical Fragility of Altruism 
When dealing with the human body, the commitment to the rhetoric of 
altruism is troubling when one realizes the exceptions that are made for 
market forces to do their work.136  Nevertheless, there is a strong attachment 
to the rhetoric of altruism.  Many pure altruists speak of altruism as 
something fragile that must be carefully nurtured and protected from 
destruction at the hands of market forces.137  This is not entirely 
unimaginable.  In comparing European countries where a market exists for 
plasma with those where plasma may not be sold, there is a measurable 
tendency for those in the lowest income quartile not to donate blood when 
they can sell plasma instead.138  This may indicate that where the poor have 
a commodification option, they are less likely to donate.  Even so, that does 
not indicate that commodification completely stamps out altruism.  Several 
studies indicate that the type of individuals who engage in “unrewarded 
gifting,” like uncompensated organ donation, are generally unlikely to be 
dissuaded from an altruistic course of action simply because others are 
rewarded for the same behavior. 
1. “True altruists” see things differently 
Joralemon points out that those who champion the rhetoric of altruism 
connect organ donation to the sorts of acts Americans perform during 
disasters and accidents: caring responses to personal tragedies . . . .  The 
generosity of strangers, the heroism of the person who risks life and limb to 
 
 135. Id. at 17 (“The language is likely borrowed from blood donation rhetoric, which refers 
to those giving up their blood as donors regardless of whether they receive money.  In both 
contexts, the terminology masks economic elements of a transaction by suggesting that the 
people giving up their body parts are doing so out of altruism rather than economic self-
interest.”). 
 136. See Katches et al., supra note 125 (discussing specific entities that make huge profits 
from selling products of donated human bodies). 
 137. See, e.g., Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tending the Generous Heart: Mandatory Pro Bono 
and Moral Development, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 468 (2001) (arguing that altruistic 
impulses, if they exist, are more fragile than egoist impulses, and thus that “any dampening 
influences on altruistic inclinations are significant.”); C. DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRUISM 
QUESTION: TOWARD A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANSWER 125-26 (1991) (“[A]ltruistic motivation 
that blossoms from feeling empathy may be a fragile flower, easily crushed by overriding 
egoistic concerns.”). 
 138. HEALY, supra note 62, at 84. 
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rescue those he or she does not know, the coming together of 
neighborhoods in mutual support at moments of natural destruction . . . .139 
The philosopher and political scientist Kristen Renwick Monroe made a 
similar finding in her efforts to define altruistic behavior.  Monroe 
interviewed Europeans who took great risks to save Jews during World War 
II in an attempt to determine what drives “true altruism.”  Monroe 
distinguishes true altruists, those who engage in “behavior intended to 
benefit another, even when [it] risks possible sacrifice to the welfare of the 
actor”140 from those who engage in “quasi-altruistic behavior”—acts which 
benefit another, but perhaps with benefit to the actor in mind.141  Monroe 
reached the conclusion that those who engage in true altruism are 
motivated by a perspective about their fellow human beings and about the 
world that is measurably different from those who do not engage in altruistic 
behavior.142  Monroe describes a perspective of a shared humanity that 
motivates altruists to take risks on behalf of those they perceive to be in 
need without taking the risk to self fully into account.143 
Several studies lend credence to this concept.  The 2005 Gallup poll 
indicates that those who would consider making a living donation to a 
stranger under the current regime of exclusive altruism are the exception, 
rather than the rule.144  This understanding of altruistic giving coincides with 
 
 139. Joralemon, supra note 103, at 344. 
 140. KRISTEN RENWICK MONROE, THE HEART OF ALTRUISM: PERCEPTIONS OF A COMMON 
HUMANITY 6 (1996). 
 141. Id. at 7.  Monroe's definition of altruism excludes giving that benefits another where 
“another's welfare is treated as an unintended or secondary consequence of behavior 
designed primarily to further [the giver's] own welfare.”  Id. at 6.  This definition would relegate 
donation done through the scholarship incentive program to quasi-altruistic status. 
 142. Id. at 204.  Quasi-altruism, as Monroe defines it, matches less restrictive definitions of 
altruism as posited by other authors.  For example, Arthur C. Brooks defines charity as “an 
expression of ‘affection’” which has “the ability to transform the giver and receiver in unique 
and important ways.”  ARTHUR C. BROOKS, WHO REALLY CARES: THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT 
COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATISM 6-7 (2006).  The only restrictions Brooks places on his 
definition are that charity must be both consensual for and beneficial to both donor and 
recipient.  Id. at 6.  A third definition of altruism, as applied specifically to organ donation 
under the current regime, posits that “[d]onation, though perhaps multi-motivational, is 
conceptually altruistic since no one may be compelled to donate an organ or tissue, either 
during life or after death.”  Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an 
Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1343 (2000). 
 143. MONROE, supra note 140, at 207.  On the other hand, Charles Daniel Batson has 
conducted research that suggests that altruism decreases as the cost of engaging in altruistic 
behavior increases.  BATSON, supra note 137, at 89.  If that is the case, then any system of 
commodification might increase altruism, if an offered incentive presents enticement sufficient 
to cause the giver to discount the potential risks involved in engaging in altruistic behavior. 
 144. See GALLUP 2005, supra note 37, at 19 tbl.5 (reporting that while 61.7% of 
respondents identified themselves as very likely to make a living donation to a family member, 
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a recent study led by Dr. L. Ebony Boulware, which found that those who 
volunteer to donate a kidney, either for a family member or to a stranger, 
show an increased willingness to take risks typically associated with kidney 
donation.145  As a first cut, the Boulware study seems to corroborate the 
notion that those who engage in pure altruism or unrewarded gifting—the 
means of kidney procurement favored rhetorically by law and the 
transplantation community—see the world differently than the majority of the 
population.  While the Boulware study does not articulate Monroe’s 
description of a “shared humanity perspective,” it does corroborate her 
findings regarding a willingness to accept risk to help others.  Other studies 
indicate that the vast majority of kidney donors engage in “‘moral,’ 
nondeliberative, instantaneous decision-making” rather than “rational 
decision-making [which] includes multiple steps that focus on gathering 
relevant information, evaluating alternatives, selecting an alternative, and 
implementing the decision.”146  In one study, seventy-eight percent of 
donors indicated that they “knew right away that they would donate.”147  In 
another study of liver lobe donors, the donors themselves specifically 
commented on the fact that they did not stop to consider and weigh the 
elements of their decision.148  Finally, an in-depth psychological evaluation 
of respondents who self-identified as willing to make a living donation of a 
kidney to a stranger found a statistically significant difference between the 
way that participants judged to be truly committed to living donation to a 
stranger evaluated the “External Costs” associated with kidney donation, 
and the way that participants judged to be uncommitted weighed those 
costs.149  Without overstating the conclusion, these data points suggest that 
 
and 31.3% expressed a willingness to donate to a close friend, only 8.1% of respondents 
stated they were very likely to make a living donation to someone they do not know). 
 145. L. Ebony Boulware et al., Attitudes, Psychology, and Risk Taking of Potential Live 
Kidney Donors: Strangers, Relatives, and the General Public, 5 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1671, 
1671-72, 1676 (2005) (finding no correlation between psychological illness, depression, or 
religious affiliation and willingness to donate kidneys, but finding increased willingness to take 
risks associated with kidney donation among nondirected donors who contacted hospitals and 
were willing to donate a kidney). 
 146. Mary Amanda Dew et al., Psychosocial Aspects of Living Organ Donation, in LIVING 
DONOR TRANSPLANTATION 7, 11 (Henkie P. Tan et al. eds., 2007). 
 147. Id. (citing ROBERTA G. SIMMONS, SUSAN D. KLEIN & RICHARD L. SIMMONS, GIFT OF LIFE: 
THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 242 tbl.8.1 (1977)). 
 148. Megan Crowley-Matoka et al., Long-Term Quality of Life Issues Among Adult-to-
Pediatric Living Liver Donors: A Qualitative Exploration, 4 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 744, 745 
(2004) (reporting that donors made statements such as “‘I think I was on automatic pilot . . . It 
happened, it happened fast and we did it.’”).  This is so, even though liver lobe donation 
could present a higher risk of harm or impairment than kidney donation.  Id. at 748. 
 149. Monica A. Landolt et al., They Talk the Talk: Surveying Attitudes and Judging Behavior 
About Living Anonymous Kidney Donation, 76 TRANSPLANTATION 1437, 1439-40 & tbl.3 
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those individuals who are willing to engage in unrewarded gifting see the 
world in a way that is markedly different than the majority of the population.  
If that intuition is correct, it may also be true that to provide kidneys 
sufficient to meet transplantation needs, it will be necessary to motivate a 
different type of potential donor in a different fashion than the one used by 
the current exclusively altruistic allocation regime.  If, on the other hand, it is 
possible to change perceptions and encourage more people to become true 
altruists by clinging to the rhetoric of gift, then this may be sufficient reason 
to prevent commodification.150  However, attempting to change at least if 
what Radin identifies as the domino theory of commodification151 (effectively 
a slippery slope rationale) holds—even partial commodification may move 
us farther away from a world where we develop an altruistic perspective in 
the population at large.  However, attempting to change the way the 
general population sees the world might prove a task too drastic for the 
rhetorical force of altruism. 
2. Rewarded gifting need not destroy altruistic giving 
If true altruists are individuals who give because of how they see the 
world, as opposed to rational actors who give because they see something 
in it for them, perhaps commodification systems designed to reach rational 
actors will also fail to dissuade true altruists from donating.  Monroe’s 
interviewees discussed their feelings about Gestapo agents who helped Jews 
late in the war as insurance against the coming Nazi defeat.152  This 
behavior is quasi-altruism, as Monroe defines it, done for the benefit of the 
Gestapo agents and not for those they helped.  For the interviewees, the 
universal response was that it was not important to them “that the motives of 
the helper be pure.  . . . [t]he more important thing was that people were 
saved, not that they were saved for the right reasons.”153  This suggests that, 
even though those who give with impure motives benefit from their quasi-
altruistic giving, the pure altruist remains willing to give so long as people 
 
(2003) (reporting on an in depth interview of fifty-two participants who identified themselves as 
willing to make a living donation to a stranger in a previous exam, and measuring a statistical 
significant variation in table 3 (P>0.0001) in the way committed and uncommitted 
participants weighed.  “[T]he external costs imposed on the donor, such as financial costs, 
extensive medical tests, fears associated with undergoing major surgery, potential health 
problems, the experience of pain, and the fear that it all might be for naught if the transplant 
is not successful.”  Id. at 1439). 
 150. If the domino theory of commodification holds true, see RADIN, supra note 111 at 
103, then even partial commodification may move us farther away from a world where the 
population at large develops an altruistic perspective. 
 151. See RADIN, supra note 111, at 103. 
 152. MONROE, supra note 140, at 146. 
 153. Id. 
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receive the help they need, and regardless of whether the pure altruist 
herself stands to benefit.  For the pure altruist, Monroe finds that altruistic 
behavior is both ingrained and somewhat subconscious.154  If the risk of 
death for themselves and their families did not dissuade true altruists from 
saving the lives of Jews in occupied Europe, why would an incentive like the 
scholarship proposal dissuade those already willing to donate kidneys to a 
fatally ill recipient? 
The Gallup Poll and the Bryce study discussed earlier suggest that while 
those who are unlikely to donate reported some negative reaction to 
commodification systems, those who were already predisposed to donate 
reported that commodification systems made them more likely to donate, 
not less likely.155  In an earlier 1993 Gallup Poll, non-Caucasian 
respondents who identified themselves as opposed to deceased donation of 
their organs became more opposed when asked about the possibility that 
their family would receive financial incentives for their organs at death.156  
For respondents contemplating deceased donation, this may stem in part 
from a concern that their families will be convinced to “pull the plug” on 
life-preserving technologies to early at the behest of the attending 
physician.157 
The Bryce study suggests that partial commodification regimes are more 
acceptable to the public than unrestrained commodification.  For example, 
funeral benefits, hospital expenses and travel reimbursement for family 
members of deceased donors, all types of rewarded gifting,158 received a 
strong positive response, while charitable cash donations in the donor’s 
name were received less favorably, and direct payment for organs, i.e., 
unrestricted commodification, was the least favored option.159  Like the other 
types of rewarded gifting, scholarships and financial aid occupy an 
 
 154. Id. at 148-49 (noting that the interviews detected “a consistent pattern of [altruistic] 
behavior, that there is indeed such a thing as the ‘altruistic personality,’ in which the habit of 
helping others has become so ingrained over the years that the helping response is virtually 
automatic.”). 
 155. Bryce et al., supra note 47, at 3002 (reporting that for respondents who identified 
themselves as registered donors, every benefit program with the exception of direct payment 
increased the likelihood that the registered donors would register again); GALLUP 2005, supra 
note 37, at 24 fig.12 (“Financial Incentives and Deceased Organ Donation 1993-2005”). 
 156. GALLUP 1993, supra note 36, at 43 tbl.32, 44. 
 157. GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS, supra note 2, at 50 (citing a survey respondent who 
indicated that “‘a lot of people feel that your organs will be harvested before you actually 
die.’”). 
 158. See generally Daar, supra note 7, at 187 (noting that reward gifting includes 
compensation for loss of wages, hospitalization and other related expenses). 
 159. Bryce et al., supra note 47, at 3001 (noting that this disparity did not amount to a 
negative reaction by respondents, even to outright commodification which was supported by 
fifty-three percent of respondents). 
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important rhetorical space between outright commodification and altruistic 
gift, which suggests that the proposed scholarship incentive would be more 
palatable to donors and the public, and less likely to trigger an adverse 
social reaction than an unrestricted cash award. 
C. The Rhetorical Power of Scholarship Incentives 
Academic scholarships are spoken of in the language of gift.  
Solicitations for donations from university alumni are typically couched as an 
invitation to contribute a gift to the alma mater.160  Those pleas rarely 
acknowledge the market exchange qualities of charitable solicitation,161 
even though the donation of a financial gift to a qualified university can 
provide the donor with significant tax and reputation benefits.  For donors 
who contribute large status-enhancing gifts, the power of the gift to signal 
the status of the giver is tied directly to its gift rhetoric—because scholarships 
and endowments are spoken of as gifts, couched in the rhetoric of altruism, 
they allow the status-seeker to be seen as someone who actually is 
charitable, instead of merely someone seeking to call attention to her 
considerable wealth.162  To speak of these donations in market language 
destroys that perception.  The behavior of donors making status-enhancing 
contributions, including the endowment of scholarships, suggests that these 
scholarships evidence the rhetorical power of gift. 
Instructions for a recent survey distributed by the California State 
University Office of the Chancellor to various departments to measure 
contributions from donors took pains to distinguish between voluntary giving 
(which the instructions refer to as “Voluntary Support of Education”)163 and 
 
 160. See, e.g., Daniel Mark Fogel & James Pizzagalli, Scholarship: The Gift of a Lifetime—
A Message from President Daniel M. Fogel and Chairman of the Board James Pizzagalli (Nov. 
1, 2004), at www.uvm.edu/~campaign/media/gallery_news_cu.php?return_URL=%2F%7 
Ecampaign%2Fnewsevents.php&SID=&G_ID=news&GI_ID=85YMywY4icLoe1v&GI_I=43 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (stating that “[a] gift to scholarships at UVM is truly the gift of a 
lifetime.”). 
 161. For example, a recent publication from the University of Chicago Law School 
mentioned the words gift, giving, or its synonyms like endow and provide, forty-nine times, 
and the financial, tax, or reputational benefits to the donor twenty-five times.  THE UNIVERSITY 
OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, ELEMENTS OF THE CENTENNIAL CAPITAL CAMPAIGN FOR EXCELLENCE 
(2004). 
 162. David Gamage & Allon Kedem, Commodification and Contract Formation: Placing 
the Consideration Doctrine on Stronger Foundations, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1299, 1332 (2006). 
 163. CAL. STATE UNIV. OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR, ADVANCEMENT REPORTING AND DATA 
COLLECTION PROCESS 5 (2008), available at www.calstate.edu/universityadvancement/ 
intranet/policies-procedures/documents/advancement_data_instructions.pdf (last visited Apr. 
9, 2009) (“What is a Gift? A contribution received by an institution for either unrestricted or 
restricted use in the furtherance of the institution for which it has made no commitment of 
resources or services other than, possibly, committing to use the gift as the donor specifies.  
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quid pro quo exchanges.164  While the instructions are careful to ensure that 
there is no quid pro quo for donors, it is equally clear that the California 
State University system goes to some lengths to recognize many of its 
donors.165 
As an examination of a recent philanthropic solicitation from the 
University of Chicago Law School suggests, the rhetoric used to solicit 
philanthropic giving to an educational institution is multifaceted, 
simultaneously appealing to a sense of duty to recompense the institution for 
what one was given; a sense of belonging for those who elect to contribute; 
a sense of quid pro quo—that the donations made to the university are an 
investment which will provide some sort of psychic, if not financial return; 
and lastly, a sense of obligation based on the need of the institution.  There 
is surprisingly little discussion of possible tax benefits to the giver, especially 
considering the reputation of the University of Chicago as a champion of 
law and economics166 and the rational actor model.167 
 
The contribution is a nonreciprocal transfer in that there is no implicit or explicit statement of 
exchange, purchase of services, or provision of exclusive information.  If the donor receives 
benefits in return for the contribution, the amount of the gift recorded and reported is reduced 
by the fair market value of all benefits given, according to U.S. Internal Revenue Service 
regulations.  The institution has no obligation to report to the donor how the gift is used or 
invested; but institutions are not prevented from providing such reports as part of donor 
stewardship.”). 
 164. Id.  Characteristics of exchange (quid pro quo) transactions to be excluded from the 
VSE survey: 
 The funding entity initiates the project, participates actively in determining how funds will 
be spent, and defines performance objectives. 
 Proprietary results belong to the funding entity, in whole or in part, after the work is 
completed. 
 Funds provide goods or services for the funding entity. 
 Results of the work have a specific commercial value for the funding entity that equal or 
exceed the amount of the grant. 
 The funding entity retains intellectual property rights (i.e. copyrights or exclusive 
knowledge of outcomes). 
 The university gives up the benefits of the research to the funding entity. 
Id. at 5-6. 
 165. See, e.g., San Diego State University: Contribution Highlights, available at 
www.calstate.edu/universityadvancement/reports/0405externalreport/campus/san_diego.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (“The San Diego State Entrepreneurial Management Center received 
a $1 million pledge from the Lavin Family Foundation for unrestricted current use support.  
The gift will be used to build programming, support research and assist students pursuing their 
entrepreneurial studies.”). 
 166. See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, Richard Posner Meets Reb Chaim of Brisk: A Comparative 
Study in the Founding of Intellectual Legal Movements, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 95, 108 (2006) 
(noting “the significance of law and economics as a late twentieth century movement, and of 
the importance of Posner and the Chicago school as leading proponents . . . .”). 
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The law also conceives of scholarships as something other than market 
transactions, even when many, if not all, scholarships are founded on an 
implicit, if not explicit, bargained-for exchange.  The Internal Revenue Code 
generally treats academic scholarships as non-taxable income,168 but where 
there is a quid pro quo involved—for example, “any amount received which 
represents payment for teaching, research, or other services by the student 
required as a condition for receiving the qualified scholarship”169—
scholarships are to be treated as valuable consideration and taxed as 
income.170 
The tax liability articulated in the Internal Revenue Code is not 
necessarily an operational reality at the university level.  For example, most 
scholarships are not taxed, even though the majority of them include 
preconditions to qualify for academic scholarships, and conditions attached 
to the continuation of such a scholarship, including maintaining a certain 
grade point average171 and not engaging in illegal activity.172  In essence, 
where academic scholarships are involved, the Internal Revenue Service 
turns a blind eye to many bargained-for exchanges. 
Athletic scholarships are also treated differently than market 
transactions,173 even though the quid pro quo of the athletic scholarship is a 
 
 167. Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1706 (1986) 
(acknowledging that the practitioners of the Chicago school method of law and economics 
“apply a neoclassical model that assumes rational actors and an inevitable drive toward 
production at marginal cost.”). 
 168. Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 117(a) (2008). 
 169. I.R.C. § 117(c)(1) (2008). 
 170. WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 92 (14th ed. 2006). 
 171. For example, students in Georgia who receive the HOPE Scholarship, which provides 
free tuition at Georgia colleges and universities, continue to qualify for the Scholarship so 
long as they maintain a 3.0 grade point average throughout their postsecondary studies.  
GACollege41, Maintaining Eligibility for the HOPE Scholarship, at www.gacollege411.org/ 
FinAid/ScholarshipsAndGrants/HOPEScholarship/maintaining.asp#a2 (last visited Apr. 9, 
2009). 
 172. See, e.g., NORTHWEST COLLEGE, NJCAA STUDENT-ATHLETE CODE OF CONDUCT (2007), 
available at www.northwestcollege.edu/athletics/docs/coc_njcaa.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 
2009) (noting that student-athletes will be suspended or dismissed from school for any arrest 
other than a minor traffic offense).  Note, however, that negative requirements are not 
necessarily viewed as a quid pro quo, according to some commentators of contract law.  
Compare Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365, 366-67 (Neb. 1898) (recognizing the lack of 
consideration in a promise from grandfather to granddaughter to support her financially 
should she restrain from working, but enforcing the promise on the grounds of promissory 
estoppel) with Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891) (holding that refraining from the 
use of liquor or tobacco is sufficient consideration for a promise to pay a sum of money at a 
later date). 
 173. Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47 (stating that athletic scholarships are not taxable 
income because “the university requires no particular activity of any of its scholarship 
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well-documented reality.174  This determination by the IRS ignores the reality 
that athletes who are not productive (or whose style of play does not suit the 
needs of a new coach) can find themselves cut from a university’s athletic 
program without any legal recourse.175  While athletic scholarships are 
treated as valuable consideration in contract disputes between student 
athletes and universities,176 the IRS simultaneously engages in the legal 
fiction that athletes are not “required [to compete] as a condition for 
receiving the qualified scholarship.”177  It is unclear why the IRS does not tax 
athletic scholarships despite their nature of providing a bargained-for 
exchange.  What is clear is that there is some incongruity between the tax 
treatment of these scholarships and their treatment in the course of contract 
disputes.  Both academic and athletic scholarships178 occupy a unique 
rhetorical middle ground between unrestricted commodification and 
altruistic giving. 
Providing financial incentives in the form of a scholarship occupies a 
different rhetorical space than that of a raw financial incentive.  An incentive 
program that naturally leads to a discussion of financial incentives in terms 
of gift language preserves the rhetoric of altruism and protects space for 
altruistic meaning. 
 
recipients.  Although students who receive athletic scholarships do so because of their special 
abilities in a particular sport and are expected to participate in the sport, the scholarship is not 
cancelled in the event the student cannot participate and the student is not required to engage 
in any other activities in lieu of participating in the sport.”). 
 174. Sean M. Hanlon, Comment, Athletic Scholarships as Unconscionable Contracts of 
Adhesion: Has the NCAA Fouled Out?, 13 SPORTS LAW. J. 41, 43-45 (2006) (describing the 
misperception that student-athletes are protected for all four years of scholarship eligibility, 
and the reality that NCAA rules permit universities to deny renewal of an athlete’s scholarship 
without cause if reasonable notice is provided). 
 175. See, e.g., Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972) 
(holding that where a student-athlete did not participate in sports when he was both 
academically and physically able to do so, the school was justified in canceling his 
scholarship), cert. denied, 192 S.E.2d 197 (N.C. 1972). 
 176. The following courts have acknowledged the contractual nature of the relationship 
between universities and scholarship athletes: Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 416-17 
(7th Cir. 1992); Jackson v. Drake Univ., 778 F. Supp. 1490, 1493 (S.D. Iowa 1991); Barile 
v. Univ. of Va., 441 N.E.2d 608, 615 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981); Colo. Seminary (Univ. of 
Denver) v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885, 895 (D. Colo. 1976); Begley v. Corp. of Mercer Univ., 
367 F. Supp. 908, 909-10 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Taylor, 191 S.E.2d at 38.  Contra Rensing v. 
Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1174-75 (Ind. 1983) (holding the relationship 
between student athletes and the university is not contractual). 
 177. I.R.C. § 117(c)(1) (2008). 
 178. See infra Part V. 
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IV.  SCHOLARSHIP INCENTIVES REDUCE COERCIVE PRESSURE AND EXPLOITATIVE 
EFFECTS 
The previous Part of this article provides the rhetorical justification for 
the scholarship incentive, and suggests that it might be an acceptable 
means of encouraging donation without triggering hostile reactions from the 
public.  However, public acceptance of the scholarship incentive does not 
resolve questions of coercion and exploitation.  Critics of commodification 
regimes frequently argue that paying donors to part with their kidney will 
exploit the donor’s poverty or lack of economic or employment opportunities 
and create coercive pressure that the donor cannot resist.  These coercive 
effects would impair the decisional capacity of donors to correctly weigh the 
costs and benefits of kidney donation.  Implicit in that argument is the notion 
that the money offered in exchange for a kidney would not adequately 
compensate the donor for taking the risk involved.  Market transfers may 
provide net harm to those donors that weigh financial considerations more 
heavily than concerns about long term health and well-being.  However, 
even if unfettered cash compensation for kidneys would impair the 
decisional capacity of potential donors, the structure of the proposed 
scholarship incentive dissipates that coercive pressure. 
The scholarship incentive is most likely to attract “emerging adults,” a 
population of potential donors aged eighteen to twenty-five,179 often viewed 
as vulnerable to coercion.180  By examining literature on availability 
heuristics, brain morphology, and analogous existing legal structures, this 
Part argues that emerging adult populations have sufficient decisional 
 
 179. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late 
Teens Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469, 470-71 (2000). 
 180. One might wonder whether the scholarship program would unduly benefit male 
scholar-donors, who need not be concerned about the health effects of donation on a 
subsequent pregnancy, but the medical literature finds no significant correlation between living 
kidney donation and complications with subsequent pregnancy.  See Lucile E. Wrenshall et al., 
Pregnancy After Donor Nephrectomy, 62 TRANSPLANTATION 1934 (1996) (reporting on forty-
five gestations and/or pregnancies among thirty-three living kidney donors and observing that 
donor nephrectomy did not introduce complications in excess of those experienced by the 
general population); J.W. Jones et al., Pregnancy Following Kidney Donation, 25 
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 3082 (1993) (reporting that fourteen female living kidney donors 
subsequently had twenty-three successful full-term pregnancies, and that for eight women who 
experienced full-term pregnancy both pre-and post-donation, “there were no differences in the 
complications or results of [the] pregnancies before and after kidney donation . . . .”).  See 
also M.M. Shekhtman & S.B. Petrova, 72 TERAPEVTICHESKĬ ARKHIV 39 (2000) (concluding that a 
“[s]olitary kidney is not contraindication to pregnancy,” but that “[o]bstetric complications 
arose more frequently than in women with two kidneys”) (Russian article, abstract available in 
English, available at www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10900647?ordinalpos=2&itool=Entrez 
System2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ResultsPanel.Pubmed_RVDocSum (last visited Apr. 9, 
2009)). 
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capacity to correctly weigh the costs and benefits of donating a kidney, even 
in view of the substantial reward of an educational scholarship, because of 
the nature of the benefit provided by an educational scholarship.  This Part 
first establishes some terms of the debate, explaining why cash rewards 
might have a coercive influence that overwhelms the decisional capacity of 
underprivileged populations.  The Part next explains the coercive effects 
already built into the current kidney allocation regime.  This Part concludes 
by describing how the scholarship incentive can protect the capacity of 
donors to make an informed, voluntary decision to donate. 
A. Unfair Transactions and Background Inequities 
Risk, as defined by Corinna Alberg and collaborators, is “[t]he possibility 
of beneficial and harmful outcomes and the likelihood of their occurrence in 
a stated timescale.”181  Risk assessment is thus the process of determining 
the likelihood that harms and benefits will occur when engaging in a 
particular course of action.  Mike Titterton, who studies health care and 
social work, defines risk taking as “a course of purposeful action based on 
informed decisions concerning the possibility of positive and negative 
outcomes of types and levels of risk appropriate in certain situations.”182  By 
these definitions, the key to assuring that risks are correctly assessed is 
making sure that the individual assessing the risk has all necessary 
information to make a correct decision. 
In the field of organ donation, medical ethics requires that a donor has 
the competence to give informed consent before the donation can move 
forward.  Medical ethics requires competence not in the abstract, but 
competence to decide to undertake a particular medical risk, called 
“decisional capacity.”183  For the purposes of this article, decisional capacity 
is the competence to recognize the risks and benefits involved with donating 
a kidney, and to make an informed choice whether or not to do so.  Some 
argue that the decisional capacity required to give informed consent to 
donation is compromised by the introduction of financial incentives.184  The 
standard argument against commodification is that markets for kidneys will 
have a coercive effect, strong enough to impair the decisional capacity of 
donors.  Implicit in that argument is an associated notion that the money 
offered in exchange for a kidney would not fully compensate the donor for 
 
 181. CORINNA ALBERG ET AL., LEARNING MATERIALS ON MENTAL HEALTH: RISK ASSESSMENT 9 
(1996). 
 182. MIKE TITTERTON, RISK AND RISK TAKING IN HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE 25 (2005). 
 183. JUDITH C. AHRONHEIM ET AL., ETHICS IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 29 (2d ed. 2000). 
 184. The ethicist Alan Wertheimer recounts that one bioethicist likens “‘dangling thousands 
of dollars in front of a poor person . . . [to] putting a gun to someone’s head and telling them 
to do something.’”  ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 68 (1987). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
306 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 2:265 
taking the risk involved, or that it would compel a potential donor to take a 
risk greater than she otherwise would undertake for a commensurate 
reward. 
There are ways in which financial incentives can compromise decisional 
capacity to donate.  First, the introduction of money may cause prospective 
donors to engage in faulty risk assessment.  Two different psychological 
phenomena, hyperbolic discounting and availability heuristics, help explain 
this possibility.  Hyperbolic discounting is a behavioral economics finding 
that people prefer smaller, immediate payoffs to larger, long-term payoffs.  
When asked to balance cash in hand against temporally distant future 
benefit or risk—such as health complications which can follow kidney 
donation—individuals typically discount the value of later benefit or risk 
because it is removed in time.185  However, when measuring two distinct 
future values, test subjects tend to pick the larger of the two values, even 
when it is removed farther in time than the first value.  Addicts186 tend to 
demonstrate a high occurrence of hyperbolic discounting, often steeply 
discounting the long-term consequences of a currently desired behavior. 
The availability heuristic is a rule of thumb for decision making, where 
an outcome seems more likely when it is more easily brought to mind, i.e., 
more available.187  A cash payment could exert a distorting effect on 
decisional capacity, because an immediate cash compensation is simply 
more “available”—i.e., more easily brought to mind—than the risks 
presented by donating a kidney, unless the donor is familiar with 
experiences that other donors have had.  The value of money is more 
readily available in making the risk assessment than the noneconomic, 
psychic benefits associated with altruistic giving.  Thus, weighing the long-
term benefits of the health of the recipient against the potential long-term 
risks to the health of the donor will lead to one type of risk calculation, while 
weighing a future health risk against cold hard cash will tend to lead to an 
entirely different evaluation. 
 
 185. Andres Raineri & Howard Rachlin, The Effect of Temporal Constraints on the Value of 
Money and Other Commodities, 6 J. BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 77, 80 (1993) (measuring 
the effect where test subjects were asked to value lottery winnings at a particular period in the 
future against a smaller, immediate amount in the present). 
 186. See, e.g., Andrew Green, Self Control, Individual Choice, and Climate Change, 26 
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 77, 92-93 (2008) (“Given hyperbolic discounting, delayed penalties or rewards 
may be ineffective to deal with addiction.  Individuals discount the delayed and uncertain 
reward or penalty more than the immediate gratification from the choice, so immediate 
rewards or penalties are likely more effective.”). 
 187. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and 
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208 (1973) (“A person is said to employ the 
availability heuristic whenever he estimates frequency or probability by the ease with which 
instances or associations could be brought to mind.”). 
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A second and related way in which cash compensation could 
compromise decisional capacity is by taking advantage of the unfortunate 
background circumstances of the donor.  While cash may be more salient 
than psychic benefits to any single individual, it is likely to be much more 
salient to an individual who comes from a background of poverty than one 
who comes from a background of wealth.188  This understanding is not 
unlike the Biblical story of Esau, willing to sell his birthright to his brother 
Jacob for a mess of pottage to satisfy his immediate hunger.  In heuristic 
terms, the “mess of pottage” Esau craved was far more salient than the 
birthright, which Esau “despised,” or undervalued, in part because of its 
temporal remoteness.189  A more modern example is the willingness of 
lottery winners to exchange their future winnings for a cash sum, even when 
doing so reduces the total amount of money the winner receives.190 
 
 188. Interestingly, the presumption that the scholarship incentive will exert undue coercive 
pressure due to the disadvantaged backgrounds of students might not be universally true.  
Several Ivy League schools have recently provided grants for, or waived tuition for, students 
whose families make less than $100,000 per year.  See Brown Ends Tuition for Lower-Income 
Students, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2008,  at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=94 
02E6DE103AF936A15751C0A96E9C8B63&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (last visited Apr. 9, 
2009) (reporting that Brown, Harvard, Yale, Dartmouth, and Stanford have all replaced loans 
for lower income students with grants); Larry Gordon, Stanford Offers Middle-Class Tuition 
Break, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2008, at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/21/local/me-
collegeaid21 (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (reporting that Stanford will eliminate tuition for 
students whose families make less than $100,000 per year).  If, as currently conceived, the 
scholarship incentive pays the costs of attending any university to which the donor can get 
admitted, then students in poverty who qualify for schools like Brown and Stanford will get no 
benefit from the incentive: it is the well-heeled student who would stand to save the tuition 
(currently $36,000 per year at Stanford) by taking advantage of the scholarship incentive.  
However, those programs do not carry very far down the line at academic institutions, because 
few schools have endowments that schools like Princeton and Harvard have amassed.  Karen 
W. Arenson, Soaring Endowments Widen a Higher Education Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2008, 
at A14 (reporting that Princeton, for example, boasts a $15.8 billion endowment, while 
Harvard’s endowment grew by $5.7 billion last year).  So the top Ivy League schools might 
change the tax bracket of potential donors most attracted to the scholarship incentive. 
 189. Genesis 25:29-34. 
 190. In Massachusetts, for example, several lottery winners sold off their payments to a 
company for a lump sum, usually giving up between seven and twenty percent of their future 
income stream.  See Bruce Mohl, Hey, Lottery Winner, Want a Lump Sum? Let the Game 
Begin, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 10, 2005, at E11.  California’s first lump sum lottery payment 
paid roughly fifty cents on the dollar.  Jamie Beckett, Lotto Prize Brokers Hit Jackpot: 
Companies Buy and Resell Annual Payments from Winners, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Apr. 11, 
1998, at D2. 
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Studies from India191 and Iran192 indicate that vendors who sold a kidney 
to get out of debt experienced a net reduction in both health and welfare 
after the sale.  It seems clear from these studies that a desire to meet short-
term financial difficulties creates pressure to engage in any number of 
potentially lucrative activities, and that desperate financial straits may impair 
decisional capacity.  However, the Iranian study also noted “an 
extraordinary lack of information about preservation of the remaining 
kidney” and a marked unwillingness or perceived inability to receive post-
operative care.193  Lack of education put vendors in a situation where they 
could do little other than physical labor.194  Few had insurance, and many 
lost work during the post-operative period.195  Finally, the Iranian vendors 
suffered a significant amount of both internal and external psychological 
stigma related to their decision to sell a kidney.  For example, many vendors 
reported that in arguments on unrelated matters, the opponent would refer 
to the vendor with the invective, “‘you kidney seller,’” to which the vendor 
had no retort, resulting in the vendor’s shame and embarrassment.196  These 
data points indicate that there is a real social weight and rhetorical power 
found in the difference between the donation and sale of kidneys.  In Iran, it 
is often a family member to whom the vendor owes money who puts 
pressure on the donor to sell the kidney.197  Finally, vendors were 
preoccupied with the loss of their kidney in part because they knew if they 
lost the second kidney, they could not afford to purchase one on the open 
market.198 
These studies suggest several important safeguards that must be built 
into the scholarship program.  First, the scholarship program must not 
circumvent a careful psychological assessment of potential donors, and of 
the family support structure in place for post-operative care.  Second, 
 
 191. Goyal, supra note 28, at 1591-92. 
 192. Javaad Zargooshi, Quality of Life of Iranian Kidney “Donors,” 166 J. UROLOGY 1790, 
1790-91 (2001) (reporting that in interviews with 307 Iranian kidney vendors, significant 
portions of the population reported dissatisfaction with their choice to sell a kidney, concerns 
about their physical health and ability to work, and showed high incidence of depression).  
Interestingly, the entire reported donor population had no more than a high school education, 
and a significant number (thirty-five percent) were identified as illiterate.  Id. at 1791, tbl.1.  It 
is hard to dispute that in the case of the Iranian vendors, severe poverty drove them to a 
decision they thought was necessary at the time, and the minority of vendors who reported 
willingness to vend again stated they would do so “because there was absolutely no other way 
to provide short-term support for their urgent financial need.”  Id. at 1796. 
 193. Id. at 1791. 
 194. Id. at 1795. 
 195. Id. at 1794. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Zargooshi, supra note 192, at 1795. 
 198. Id. at 1796. 
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reasonable post-operative care must be provided to donors, regardless of 
income, insurance, or other factors.  Third, it is crucial that donors applying 
for the scholarship program are provided with sufficient information to make 
an informed consent, specifically about long term health risks for the loss of 
the second kidney.  Fourth, all donors (both altruistic and scholarship) 
should be awarded priority for obtaining a kidney in the case of a future 
accident or disease.  Finally, there must be a mechanism which provides 
equally for rich and poor potential recipients to be able to obtain a kidney.  
The method of distributing kidneys cannot depend on the ability of the 
recipient to pay.  The perception that poverty cuts vendors off from kidneys if 
they should face a future need seems to add to the emotional and 
psychological harms that vendors suffer.199 
B. Coercive Effects of the Current Regime 
Any system of commodification could exploit the background 
circumstances faced by potential donors.200  On one level, the scholarship 
incentive is no different.  Those who are financially well off, or who can 
afford the best education available, will not be attracted to the proposed 
scholarship incentive.  Open market advocates argue that preventing 
underprivileged parties from selling that which they possess hurts them far 
worse than any potential unfairness that background circumstances 
introduce into the underlying bargain.201  In addition, the current regime of 
exclusive altruism also exploits vulnerable groups based on background 
situations outside the control of the transplantation industry.  The following 
examples are illustrative. 
First, the current shortage of kidneys available for transplantation creates 
background pressure which drive wealthy potential recipients to third world 
countries where there is little in the way of regulation, information, or 
aftercare provided for kidney vendors.202  In some of those countries, 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION 27 (1996) (discussing how, for example, “poor 
background circumstances” might be understood to “‘force’” a recruit to join the military 
because there is no better option). 
 201. Id. at 111 (noting that even if background conditions compromise the voluntariness of 
a person’s choice in accepting an offer, “it is arguable that it is the background conditions 
that are the problem and not the offer that allows [the person] to improve on those 
background conditions.  The offer is still a positive good.”). 
 202. Curt S. Koontz & Joseph B. Cofer, What Price Should Be Paid for Organs?, 61 
CURRENT SURGERY 419, 420 (2004) (reviewing the study of Indian kidney vendors by Goyal et 
al., (see supra note 28) and noting that in light of the reality of a vibrant black market in third 
world countries, “[Goyal’s] study could support the notion that developed countries . . . should 
lead the way in setting standards for compensating ‘donors’. . . .  Otherwise, donors may be 
exploited and their health compromised in underdeveloped countries with a black market.”). 
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kidneys are often obtained in ways that actively exploit the population (for 
example, upfront cash donation without adequate information or follow-up 
care),203 or are taken by force.  In one recent case, the mastermind behind 
a kidney procurement racket recruited men in India for construction work, 
had them forcibly anesthetized, and then removed their kidneys without 
consent for transplant into foreign recipients.204 
Second, the family dynamic creates significant coercive pressure on 
related donors,205  and shortages inherent in the current kidney procurement 
system create pressures that coerce the participation of minor donors.  
Desperate family members occasionally pressure small children or 
incompetents to donate, and judges sign off on the donation as being in the 
best interest of the donor, because of the familial relationship of the donor 
to the recipient.206  Courts justify the use of children and incompetent family 
members as organ suppliers because of the perception that there are no 
other options.  For example, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals found a 
fourteen year old girl with Down’s Syndrome could not voluntarily consent to 
donating her kidney to her brother,207 nor could her mother consent for her 
on the grounds that the donation was a therapeutic medical procedure that 
benefited the donor.208  Nevertheless, the court upheld a trial court decision 
allowing the donation on the grounds that the girl would receive substantial 
psychological benefits from making the donation because it would preserve 
the life of her brother, with whom she had a close relationship.209 
The transplantation community is now recognizing the coercive effects 
that some subordinate relationships might have on the potential donor, such 
 
 203. See supra Part IV.A. 
 204. Rama Lakshmi, India Uncovers Kidney Racket: Poor Laborers Were Victims of Organ-
Trafficking Network, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2008, at A11 (reporting that the mastermind of a 
recently disrupted Indian kidney racket “‘used to charge about 15 lakh rupees [$37,500] from 
rich patients around the world and pay about 50,000 rupees [$1,270] to the laborer after 
forcibly removing the kidney.’”). 
 205. See B. Larijani et al., Rewarded Gift for Living Renal Donors, 36 TRANSPLANTATION 
PROC. 2539, 2540 (2004) (“The people who voluntarily donate an organ to a relative are 
sometimes subject to greater coercion than those who sell their organs, because of internal 
pressure and pressure from other family members to save the loved one.”). 
 206. Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 498-500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 
S.W.2d 145, 146, 149 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969); Goodwin, The Body Market, supra note 10, at 
635.  But cf. Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1344-45 (Ill. 1990) (denying the petition of 
the noncustodial father of twin boys to have them tested for compatibility to donate bone 
marrow to their half brother.  The brother died before a donor could be found.). 
 207. Little, 576 S.W.2d at 493-95. 
 208. Id. at 495. 
 209. Id. at 500. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] THE KIDNEY DONOR SCHOLARSHIP ACT 311 
as employer-employee or teacher-student,210 but in other cases they 
underestimate the coercive effect of subordinate family relationships.211 
C. The Scholarship Incentive Protects the Capacity to Consent 
An oft-repeated refrain regarding markets for organs is that financial 
incentives coerce behavior in a way that a regime of altruistic giving will 
not.212  This claim has not gone undisputed,213 but let us assume that this 
concern is valid at its extreme: an unrestricted cash-for-kidney system would 
exert sufficient coercive pressure that poor people would allow themselves to 
be exploited, and additionally miscalculate the risks involved in living 
donation.214  This Part of the article argues that the coercive pressure which 
may be inherent in a cash-for-kidney market system will be ameliorated by 
the proposed scholarship regime. 
1. Intertemporal choices and scholarship incentives 
One recent study by neuroscientist Samuel McClure and his 
collaborators suggests that the cognitive mechanisms of the brain explain 
hyperbolic discounting.  The McClure study measured the cognitive 
mechanisms of the brain, and found they respond differently to the promise 
of immediate monetary reward than they do to temporally remote 
benefits.215  When participants were offered a choice between an immediate 
monetary reward and a greater reward at a future point in time, those 
participants who selected the immediate reward displayed increased activity 
in the limbic system, the part of the brain connected with impulse decisions 
and addiction.  When selecting between two monetary rewards at a future 
point in time, where the reward closer in time was less than the reward 
 
 210. Dew et al., supra note 128, at 1048 (reporting the recommendations of seventy 
transplantation professionals regarding psychological evaluations for nondirected altruistic 
donors). 
 211. Id. at 1049 tbl.2 (identifying “[s]ubordinate relationship (e.g. employee/employer) or 
other evidence of coercion” as a factor with “heightened importance for unrelated donors”).  
The Dew Guidelines also express concern that nondirected donors are more likely to fall prey 
to an exaggerated emotional appeal than directed donors, concluding that directed donors 
were more likely to have made the decision to donate “against a backdrop of ongoing 
education about treatment options and potential treatment outcomes.”  Id. at 1049. 
 212. See, e.g., Holloway, supra note 110, at 153 (arguing that payment for organs would 
result in the dehumanization and degradation of the poor, who are “the ones who need 
money badly enough to resort to the sale of their own body parts.”). 
 213. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, 
and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1841 (2007) (arguing that the risks 
involved with organ donation are not sufficient to justify the current ban). 
 214. Goyal et al., supra note 28, at 1591-92. 
 215. Samuel M. McClure et al., Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed 
Monetary Rewards, 306 SCIENCE 503, 503 (2004). 
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further in time, the selection process was correlated with increased activity in 
the lateral prefrontal cortex, the posterior parietal cortex, and associated 
structures, which are connected with the ability to plan, make abstract 
decisions, and engage in rational deliberation.216  In addition, decisions 
which were more difficult than others (where difficulty was measured by the 
time it took to make the decision) tended to trigger more significant 
responses from the prefrontal cortex structures.217  These findings suggest 
that immediate cash compensation elicits impulse decisions in a way more 
likely to impair decisional capacity than a delayed benefit like the proposed 
scholarship incentive. 
If this literature is correct, then the scholarship incentive would be, by its 
nature, more likely to trigger prefrontal response mechanisms and less likely 
to trigger responses in the limbic system, which are associated with impulse 
decisions.  However, the scholarship incentive also raises a particular 
concern because of its admitted target population: “emerging adults,” the 
population between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five.218 
2. Do emerging adults have the capacity to provide informed consent? 
Donor age has increased over the past decade.  Unfortunately, the 
older the donor, the more likely that renal function has declined.219  
Medically speaking, emerging adults are perfect donor candidates.220  
However, emerging adult donors might also be thought to be more 
susceptible to an unfair or coercive transaction than more mature adults. 
The potential benefits that the proposed scholarship program would 
provide the donor population can be illustrated in part by looking to the 
various G.I. College Bills.  There too, the typical beneficiaries are emerging 
adults.  The economic benefits of the G.I. Bill for society on the whole are 
generally uncontested.221  Scholars estimate that the G.I. Bill returned 
 
 216. Id. at 504-05. 
 217. Id. at 505 & fig.2, 506 fig.3 (measuring in figure 3 significant increases in brain 
activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the right 
lateral orbitofrontal cortex, and the inferoparietal cortex). 
 218. Arnett, supra note 179, at 470-71. 
 219. McCauley et al., supra note 66, at 28. 
 220. Id. (“[T]he ideal potential donor is one who is young and in perfect health.”).  The 
lack of kidneys available through current procurement means has required relaxing standards 
for what constitutes the ideal donor.  Id.  Thus, inasmuch as we increase living donation, we 
may enable hospitals to be more selective, with the associated benefit that donors with poorer 
health, and less likely to make a successful donation, are less likely to be selected for 
donation. 
 221. MICHAEL J. BENNETT, WHEN DREAMS CAME TRUE: THE GI BILL AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN AMERICA 7 (1996) (“The GI Bill was the catalyst creating our present postcapitalist 
society . . . .”); PETER F. DRUCKER, POST-CAPITALIST SOCIETY 3 (1993) (identifying the G.I. Bill as 
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something between five and twelve times the capital expended on it in terms 
of tax revenues alone.222  While it is difficult to confidently unpack 
educational benefits from the other benefits of the G.I. Bill, such as 
subsidized mortgages for housing and low interest business loans,223 other 
indicators suggest that education significantly increases the earning power 
of the educated person over his or her uneducated peers, including an 
average increase of nearly $18,000 in average yearly earning power over 
the last two decades.224 
On the other hand, the G.I. Bill is challenged on the grounds that its 
modern educational benefits are insufficient compared to the risks of military 
service, which fall disproportionately on persons of color.225  The concern 
that educational benefits can impair the decisional capacity of emerging 
adults is also reflected in other lines of scholarship, including the coercion 
test utilized by the Supreme Court in Establishment Clause which looks both 
to the age of those subject to a potentially coercive message and the 
environment in which the exposure takes place. 
There is a general concern that high school and college students are 
more susceptible to religious coercion than older adults, who typically 
 
a transformative event that helped usher in a “shift to the knowledge society[,]” and arguing 
that perhaps nothing more important occurred in the twentieth century). 
 222. Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 62 MD. L. 
REV. 515, 558 (2003).  “The GI Bill fueled decades of growth through education expenditures 
that significantly improved the quality of the nation’s human capital.”  Id. at 571. 
 223. Id. at 557. 
 224. Comparing the average income for high school male graduates from 1990-2004 
against the average income for a male graduate of a four-year college or university during the 
same period shows an increase in average income from $31,039 per year ($465,583 over 
15 years) to $48,940 per year ($734,099 over 15 years), a difference of $17,901.  THOMAS 
D. SNYDE ET AL., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2005, at 624 tbl.378 (2006). 
 225. See Merrily Davies, You Can’t Be All You Can Be if You Are Dead, COMMUNITY 
ALLIANCE (Fresno, Cal.) Apr. 2006, at 15.  Of course, the fact that a course of action falls 
disproportionately upon minority populations does not mean that those populations should be 
prevented from deciding whether the benefits are worth the risks.  As Michele Goodwin writes 
regarding organ donation, “African Americans are caught in a strange, conflicting matrix, 
which calls them noble and generous if they surrender organs and blood without 
compensation, but naïve, unsophisticated, and prone to exploitation and coercion if they are 
compensated for undergoing a non-therapeutic organ removal.  In addition to the racism 
seemingly inherent in scholarship that casts Blacks as naïve or potentially criminal if they are 
compensated for sharing organs, the discourse about organ and tissue procurement and 
allocation regimes also often portrays African Americans as victims rather than recipients or 
donors.”  Goodwin, The Body Markets, supra note 10, at 607.  See also WERTHEIMER, supra 
note 200, at 111 (arguing in the realm of surrogate gestation, that “[i]f a woman can 
reasonably regard surrogacy as improving her overall welfare given that society has unjustly 
limited her options, it is arguable that it would be adding insult to injury to deny her that 
opportunity.”). 
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encounter religious messages outside of the academic setting.226  The 
Supreme Court has turned to a “coercion test” for violations of the 
Establishment Clause which looks both to the age of those potentially 
subject to coercion, and the environment in which they are exposed to a 
potentially coercive message.227  Courts have found that college students 
are “uniquely susceptible to [religious] coercion” when faced with a religious 
prayer in an academic setting,228 while participants exposed to prayer in a 
legislative session were considered “not readily susceptible to ‘religious 
indoctrination,’ . . . or peer pressure.”229 
Scholars have also argued that athletic scholarships exploit college 
athletes in a way more likely to harm Black athletes than White athletes,230 
in part because Black athletes are more likely to be funneled into fields that 
are unlikely to provide sufficient income after graduation.231  These 
arguments suggest that the disadvantaged background of Black college 
athletes allow for the exploitation of those athletes.  That may be more 
 
 226. See Elizabeth B. Halligan, Note, Coercing Adults?: The Fourth Circuit and the 
Acceptability of Religious Expression in Government Settings, 57 S.C. L. REV. 923, 936 (2006) 
(noting that the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has keyed off the age 
and maturity of those subject to a potentially coercive influence). 
 227. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311 (2000) (holding that a 
student prayer at a school sponsored football game violated the Establishment Clause, in part 
because such a sporting event was “part of a complete educational experience.”); Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (holding that a prayer offered at a high school 
graduation violated the Establishment Clause because the school district’s “supervision and 
control . . . places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students . . . [which] 
though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.”). 
 228. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 371-72 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that supper 
prayers at a military college violated the Establishment Clause, in part due to the coercive 
atmosphere of the military college and in part due to the susceptibility of the students to 
coercion). 
 229. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (holding that a prayer at the start of 
a legislative session did not violate the Establishment Clause) (citations omitted). 
 230. Otis B. Grant, African American College Football Players and the Dilemma of 
Exploitation, Racism and Education: A Socio-Economic Analysis of Sports Law, 24 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 645, 649 (2003) (reporting that while African American college football players 
“successfully bargained for a free education in exchange for playing football . . . they do not 
graduate on par with their White counterparts . . . [which] means that on average, most 
African American players do not benefit from their ‘bargained-for exchange’”). 
 231. The False Promise of Black Athletic Scholarships, 6 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Winter 
1994-1995, at 36, 36-37 (noting that “many [Black] student athletes are enrolled in college 
simply to play basketball.  Many go through the motions of college instruction (often with the 
complicity of the administration, faculty, and coaching staff) so they will maintain their athletic 
eligibility.  Only 35 percent of black male basketball players on athletic scholarships at NCAA 
Division I institutions go on to earn a diploma.”). 
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stereotype than substance.232  Nevertheless, it would be odd to suggest the 
correct solution to the exploitation of college athletes is to prevent them 
from receiving any benefit from the scholarship program, or to require 
athletes to donate their time and skills without any scholarship benefits at all.  
If there are concerns about the coercive effects of scholarship benefits, then 
the experience of college athletes teaches two things.  First, the scholarship 
incentive must provide opportunities for academic success.  This suggests 
that the proposed scholarship program ought not affect admissions to a 
particular institution, but instead ought to pay for schooling at an institution 
where the donor was admitted on merit, but would otherwise be unlikely or 
unable to attend because of cost.  Second, there is reason to think the 
scholarship incentive ought to include academic counseling, and perhaps 
tutoring, to assure that donors who receive the opportunity for education are 
equipped to make the most of it. 
The aforementioned concerns are due in part to the youth of those who 
typically consider educational opportunities or are involved in educational 
institutions.233  Some recent scientific data suggests that risk taking 
behaviors do not peak at the end of adolescence, generally at age eighteen 
to nineteen,234 but instead during emerging adulthood.235  Restrictions on 
 
 232. Compare Tommy Craggs, Where They Come From, ESPN THE MAGAZINE, Feb. 25, 
2008, at 50 (study finding that the childhood home of the average NBA basketball player 
spent his formative years in a hometown that was medium-sized, middle-class, diverse, and as 
educated as the United States as a whole), with DARCY FREY, THE LAST SHOT: CITY STREETS, 
BASKETBALL DREAMS 13-15, 22-24, 30, 32 (1994) (documenting the difficult background of 
four high school students from Coney Island who struggled to meet the academic 
requirements to play in the NCAA). 
 233. See, e.g., Sarah M. Lavigne, Comment, Education Funding in Maine in Light of 
Zelman and Locke: Too Much Play in the Joints?, 59 ME. L. REV. 511, 523 n.82 (2007) 
(noting that some programs allow school voucher funds to go to religious schools so long as 
the schools agree “‘not to compel any student attending the private school [by benefit of the 
voucher program] to profess a specific ideological belief, to pray, or to worship.’”) (alteration 
in original) (citing FLA. STAT. § 229.0537(4)(j) (repealed 2003)); Hanlon, supra note 174, at 
69-74 (describing the inequitable bargaining power between universities and athletic 
departments who control athletic scholarships and the athletes who depend on them). 
 234. Arnett, supra note 179, at 476 (“[C]ontemporary scholars generally consider 
adolescence to begin at age 10 or 11 and to end by age 18 or 19.”). 
 235. Craig M. Bennett & Abigail A. Baird, Anatomical Changes in the Emerging Adult 
Brain: A Voxel-Based Morphometry Study, 27 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 766, 766-67 (2006) 
(reporting that the brains of college freshmen who have moved at least 100 miles from home 
to attend college evidence anatomical changes which support the finding that emerging adults 
continue to mature developmentally between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five); Jerald G. 
Bachman et al., Transitions in Drug Use During Late Adolescence and Young Adulthood, in 
TRANSITIONS THROUGH ADOLESCENCE: INTERPERSONAL DOMAINS AND CONTEXT 111, 117-18 & 
fig.5.3 (Julia A. Graber et al. eds., 1996) (reporting on data indicating that rates of binge 
drinking among reported subjects peak at age twenty-one to twenty-two and do not fall below 
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certain privileges for those in the emerging adulthood phase—for example, 
legally purchasing or consuming alcohol, or renting an automobile236—
implies that many individuals between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five 
are not to be fully vested with the autonomy of decision making that society 
vests in older persons. 
Decisional capacity is not tied to a hard and fast age limit.  As current 
science recognizes, some individuals evidence the ability to make rational 
decisions and take responsibility for their health and welfare at an earlier 
age than others.237  In fact, some scholarship suggests that while 
adolescents in their late teens do not make risk assessments in the way that 
an adult would,238 they are benefited by opportunities to weigh information 
and make decisions for themselves.239 
 
pre-adolescent levels until age twenty-eight to twenty-nine).  One possible explanation for the 
spike in binge drinking at the age of twenty-one is that alcohol is first legally available to 
emerging adults when they turn twenty-one.  While binge drinking is certainly a risky behavior, 
perhaps it shows a certain amount of foresight that some young adults wait until they are 
legally of age before they engage in such behavior. 
 236. Arthur J. Matas, Ethics of Paid Living-Unrelated Donation: The Case for a Regulated 
System of Kidney Sales, in LIVING DONOR TRANSPLANTATION, 418, 424-25 (Henkie P. Tan et al. 
eds., 2007). 
 237. See Sandra Hoffmann, Since Children Are Not Little Adults—Socially—What’s an 
Environmental Economist to Do?, 17 DUKE ENV. L. & POL’Y F. 209, 222-25 (2007) (discussing 
that some children learn to assess expected outcomes earlier than other children). 
 238. Thomas Grisso, What We Know About Youths’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, in 
YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 139, 161-62 (Thomas 
Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2003) (reporting on recent studies indicating that 
adolescents may differ from adults in underestimating the possible losses of their behavior, 
and that young adolescents, or adolescents with low IQ scores will tend to weigh short term 
benefits more heavily than long term benefits). 
 239. Paul Arshagouni, “But I’m an Adult Now . . . Sort Of”: Adolescent Consent in Health 
Care Decision-Making and the Adolescent Brain, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 315, 323-24 
(2006) (suggesting that an inability to project future circumstances might actually militate in 
favor of expanding the rights of youth to privacy in their medical decisions, and in their rights 
to consent to medical procedures independent of their parents as a means for fostering 
responsible behavior and decision making); EUGEEN VERHELLEN, CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS 
OF THE CHILD 27-29 (3d ed., 2000) (arguing that observation of children, especially in war-
torn or chaotic regions, provides evidence that they are capable of participating as full-
fledged members of society with rights and freedoms, and that their capacity for self-
determination should be recognized because that will allow them the opportunity to develop 
that capacity); Donald L. Beschle, The Juvenile Justice Counterrevolution: Responding to 
Cognitive Dissonance in the Law’s View of the Decision-Making Capacity of Minors, 48 EMORY 
L.J. 65, 96, 101-02 (1999) (noting that the social science data of the day provided at least 
provisional support for the proposition that adolescents aged seventeen and above possess 
the same capacity to make significant life decisions as adults, while recognizing they might 
reach different decisions than the adults). 
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One recent brain morphometry study demonstrated measurable 
changes in the brain structure of college freshmen who moved at least 100 
miles away from home to attend college.240  The changes occurred in parts 
of the brain associated with the ability to “integrate diverse sensory 
components for use in higher-order [decisionmaking] processes.”241  The 
study was inconclusive regarding whether the significant changes in the 
environment triggered the growth of brain structure, or whether the growth 
was “a result of a predetermined neurodevelopmental trajectory”.242  Some 
research indicates that changes in environment alter brain structures,243 
which might indicate that undertaking new experiences and making difficult 
decisions increases the capacity to make difficult decisions.244  Other 
scholars have suggested that because “impulsive behavior and risk-taking 
associated with late adolescence does not begin to stabilize until the mid-
twenties,”245 both marriage and the decision to start a family might be 
contraindicated until the period of emerging adolescence has ended.246 
Science is thus inconclusive on the ability of emerging adults to correctly 
ascertain risk, but the law is fairly uniform in presuming decisional capacity 
on the part of those who reach the age of majority, and in some 
circumstances, even younger.  Mature-minor statutes indicate that even 
adolescents younger than eighteen should be, and are, allowed to make 
medical decisions for themselves when they evidence sufficient capacity.  
Some states adopt a rule of sevens, treating minors under seven years of 
age as having no capacity to consent, minors between seven and fourteen 
as under a rebuttable presumption of no capacity, and minors between 
fourteen and eighteen as under a rebuttable presumption of capacity.247  In 
 
 240. Bennett & Baird, supra note 235, at 767. 
 241. Id. at 774. 
 242. Id. at 775. 
 243. Id. at 775 (citing Sara L. Bengtsson et al., Extensive Piano Practicing Has Regionally 
Specific Effects on White Matter Development, 8 NAT. NEUROSCIENCE 1148 passim (2005) 
(explaining that musical training at an early age is an important factor behind the 
development of high-level abilities in other domains)); Bogdan Draganski et al., Changes in 
Grey Matter Induced by Training, 427 NATURE 311, 311 (2004) (reporting findings that 
indicate that “learning-induced cortical plasticity is also reflected at a structural level.”); 
Eleanor A. Maguire et al., Navigation-Related Structural Change in the Hippocampi of Taxi 
Drivers, 97 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 4398, 4399 (2000) (noting an increase in gray 
matter volume in the brains of taxi drivers). 
 244. VERHELLEN, supra note 239, at 27-29. 
 245. Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Red Families V. Blue Families 4 (The Geo. Wash. 
Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 343, Aug. 16, 2007), at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paperss.cfm?abstract_id=1008544 (last visited Apr. 9, 2009). 
 246. Id. 
 247. See, e.g., Miller ex rel. Miller v. Dacus, 231 S.W.3d 903, 908 (Tenn. 2007) (finding 
that a minor aged seventeen years, seven months was a “mature minor” who could provide 
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most jurisdictions, a minor may be granted a “mature minor” exception to 
the requirement that an adult approve medical treatment for a minor 
child.248  As Rhonda Gay Hartman has noted, the “paramount consideration 
[of state legislatures] in enacting these state statutes has been increasing 
recognition of adolescent decisional ability in light of the opinions of health 
care professionals who deem it appropriate to treat an adolescent in the 
absence of parental or guardian authority.”249 
State marriage laws also recognize the capacity of emerging adults to 
make critical decisions influencing their futures.  Every state but one250 
allows adults of eighteen years of age to obtain a marriage license without 
parental consent or court approval.251  Some of those states also allow 
minors under the age of eighteen to obtain a marriage license without 
parental consent with approval of a court.252 
The law allows youth of eighteen years to volunteer for military service, 
to vote, to drive, to stand trial as an adult, and to be considered 
independent from their parents without any intervention of the state.  Taking 
those capacities as data points, it appears that eighteen is old enough to 
 
informed consent to a medical procedure, and to whom medical treatment may be provided 
without obtaining parental consent) (citing Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 755 (Tenn. 
1987)). 
 248. Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 748, 755 (noting that under Tennessee law, “the capacity 
[of a minor] to consent to medical treatment depends upon the age, ability, experience, 
education, training, and degree of maturity or judgment obtained by the minor, . . . the 
conduct and demeanor of the minor at the time of the incident involved . . . [, as well as] the 
nature of the treatment and its risks or probable consequences, and the minor's ability to 
appreciate the risks and consequences . . . .”); AHRONHEIM ET AL., supra note 183, at 32 
(reporting that the mature minor exception grants decision making authority at around age 
fifteen, based on fact-specific circumstances). 
 249. Hartman, supra note 142, at 1311. 
 250. Mississippi is the only state that does not automatically allow eighteen year olds to 
obtain a marriage license.  MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-5(a) (2008) requires that if the female 
applicant for a marriage license is under the age of twenty-one and a resident of the state, 
then the application must be made in the county where the applicant resides, and must 
include the names and addresses of the female applicant’s parents or next of kin.  Id.  In 
addition, the application is subject to a three-day waiting period, which can be waived by a 
judge.  Id. § 93-1-5(b).  The county clerk is also required by law to inform parents if either 
party “appears from the evidence to be under twenty-one (21) years of age . . . .”  Id. 
 251. NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 434-38 tbl.29 (Richard A. Leiter ed., 5th ed. 2005) 
(reporting that in Mississippi, the minimum legal age to marry without parental consent is 
twenty-one). 
 252. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-108 (2008) (granting authority to the juvenile 
court to order the county clerk and the recorder to issue a marriage license to a party aged 
sixteen or seventeen years even if a parent or guardian has not provided consent, so long as a 
reasonable effort has been made to notify the parents, and the court “finds that the underage 
party is capable of assuming the responsibilities of marriage and the marriage would serve his 
best interests.”). 
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determine whether donating a kidney is a prudent choice for the donor, 
especially given evidence that indicates the limited health risk of living 
donation.253  This is particularly true when comparing kidney donation to 
military service, which poses significant risks to soldiers.254  If it is acceptable 
to let high school students hear a recruitment pitch and enlist when they turn 
eighteen, it should be acceptable from a risk assessment perspective to 
allow them to gather information about the risks involved with kidney 
donation and make a commitment to donate when they turn eighteen.  It 
should be noted that while the current donation regime requires a court 
order to allow donation from those under the age of eighteen, there is a 
strong legal presumption that once a donor has reached the age of 
 
 253. See R. Pretagostini et al., Survival in Kidney Transplantation from Living Donors: A 
Single-Center Experience, 36 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 467, 467-68 (2004) (reporting no 
perioperative mortality among a study of 600 donors); Thiagarajan Ramcharan & Arthur J. 
Matas, Long-Term (20–37 Years) Follow-Up of Living Kidney Donors, 2 AM. J. 
TRANSPLANTATION 959, 959-60 (2002) (reporting that in a population of 380 living donors still 
alive at the time of the study, the majority of donors had normal renal function 20-37 years 
post donation, and of 84 living donors who had since died, only 3 were known to have died 
of kidney failure); Eric M. Johnson et al., Long-Term Follow-Up of Living Kidney Donors: 
Quality of Life After Donation, 67 TRANSPLANTATION 717, 717-19 (1999) (reporting that in a 
survey of 524 living donors whose surgery occurred at the University of Minnesota between 
1984 and 1996, the majority of donors reported good quality of life, that donation was little 
or no financial burden, that problems with health insurance were not stressful or only a little 
stressful, and that they did not regret donating); R. Saran et al., Long-Term Follow-Up of 
Kidney Donors: A Longitudinal Study, 12 NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS TRANSPLANTATION 1615, 1616, 
1620 (1997) (finding among a group of 47 kidney donors that renal function appears 
relatively well preserved 20 to 30 years after donation).  Eugene Volokh reports that living 
donors face approximately the same yearly risk of death as those working as long-haul truck 
drivers.  Volokh, supra note 213, at 1841-42.  See also Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 
149 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (noting that upon donating a kidney, the statistical life expectancy of 
a healthy 35 year old adult drops from 99.3% to 99.1% during the next 5 succeeding years, 
equivalent to the risk “incurred by driving a car for 16 miles every working day . . . .”) (internal 
citation omitted).  Note as well that the numbers reported in Strunk were from 1969.  Medical 
care for donors has significantly improved in the past forty years. 
 254. See, e.g., GULF WAR AND HEALTH: PHYSIOLOGIC, PSYCHOLOGIC, AND PSYCHOSOCIAL 
EFFECTS OF DEPLOYMENT-RELATED STRESS 248-58 (Inst. of Med., Nat. Acad. ed., 6th ed. 2008) 
(cataloguing the health risks accompanying military service); Military Service Doubles Suicide 
Risk, SCIENCE DAILY, June 12, 2007, at www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/06/07061207 
5148.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (reporting that the suicide rate of soldiers who saw 
combat is twice that of the general population); contra Samuel H. Preston & Emily Buzzell, 
Service in Iraq: Just How Risky?, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2006, at A21 (noting that while the 
death rate for U.S. men aged 18-39 in 2003 was 1.53 per 1,000 person years—39% of 
which was due to the deaths of troops in Iraq (3.92 deaths per 1,000 person years)—that 
number is less than the risk of death for Black youth in Philadelphia (4.37 per 1,000 person 
years in 2002)). 
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majority,255 “specific evidence of incapacity is required to call into question 
an adult’s empowerment to make his or her own decisions.”256  The 
scientific evidence does not sufficiently call into question the decisional 
capacity of donors who have reached the age of majority, so as a legal 
matter, the presumption of capacity for donors over the age of eighteen 
should hold true.257 
If further studies solidify the intuition that emerging adults lack decisional 
capacity, the proposed scholarship incentive could be restricted to more 
mature students, perhaps providing scholarship incentives for law, medical, 
business, or other graduate students.258  Like an undergraduate scholarship 
program, a graduate scholarship incentive could provide large benefits for a 
student who is concerned about the ability to pay for the loans accrued at 
high end schools.259  Such an orientation may not provide enough incentive 
 
 255. See, e.g., Vivek Sharma et al., Pediatric Living-Donor Kidney Transplantation, in 
LIVING DONOR TRANSPLANTATION 149, 151 (Henkie P. Tan et al. eds., 2007) (noting that in 
exceptional cases, a court order can allow a donation to go forward when it involves a donor 
under the age of eighteen). 
 256. AHRONHEIM ET AL., supra note 183, at 29. 
 257. It should be noted that individual OPOs have differing policies for the acceptable 
minimum age of nondirected donors.  For example, the transplant center at the University of 
Minnesota rejects nondirected donors who are younger than twenty-one.  Cheryl L. Jacobs et 
al., Twenty-Two Nondirected Kidney Donors: An Update on a Single Center’s Experience, 4 
AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1110, 1111 (2004) (reporting that the center rejected 3 potential 
nondirected donors out of 360 interested callers because they were under the age of 21).  The 
center explained the decision to raise its minimum age from 18 to 21, noting that “[t]he few 
inquirers who were under 21 years had either voiced parental concerns about donating or 
avoided telling their parents altogether for fear of their disapproval or anger.  Therefore, we 
were concerned about possible family stress, lack of support after donation, and donor 
vulnerability during recovery.”  Id. at 1114. 
 258. Stanford University’s Career Development Center reports that the average age of a 
first-year law student is twenty-four.  Stanford University Career Development Center, Law 
Overview, at http://cardinalcareers.stanford.edu/law/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).  The average 
age of first year business students “at the top business schools” is twenty-seven.  Yahoo! 
Education, Admissions to Business School, at http://education.yahoo.com/college/essentials/ 
articles/biz/bschool-admissions.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).  The ages of the 2008 
incoming class at Harvard Medical School ranged from twenty-one to thirty-six.  Harvard 
Medical School, Admissions FAQs, at http://hms.harvard.edu/admissions/default.asp?page 
=admissions (last visited Apr. 9, 2009). 
 259. Medical school graduates carry an average post-graduation debt of $130,571.  
Editorial, Repair Student Loan Repayment Law: A Federal Legislative Change in How Medical 
School Graduates Repay Their Loans Leaves Residents in a Financial Pinch, AM. MED. NEWS, 
Nov. 19. 2007, at www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2007/11/19/edsa1119.htm (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2009).  First year associate lawyers typically bear a debt from undergraduate and law 
school of $80,000.  Am. Bar Ass’n, 2006 Legislative Priorities: Student Loan Forgiveness, at 
www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/student_loan.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) [hereinafter 
Student Loan Forgiveness]. 
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however, for many students at top tier legal, medical, and business schools, 
where starting salaries after graduation have historically been sufficient to 
quickly pay down loans.  In the field of law, for instance, compensation for 
starting attorneys at some blue chip law firms is $160,000, and partner pay 
can top $1 million.260  When contrasted with the salary range of the typical 
government lawyer ($43,300 to $46,300 in 2006) or legal services attorney 
($36,000 in 2006),261 it is obvious that the scholarship incentive highlights 
a troubling trend and might raise questions of coercion.262  If attorneys 
committed to public interest work are most likely to take advantage of the 
scholarship incentive to avoid crushing loan repayments, then the 
scholarship incentive would be vulnerable to the criticism that it enables 
lawyers to engage in public interest law, but only if those public minded 
lawyers are literally willing to “sell a kidney” to do it.  There would also be a 
concern that limiting participation to students in professional programs 
might restrict the potential donor population to such an extent that it could 
not meet the need for transplantable kidneys.263 
3. The scholarship incentive encourages informed consent 
The proposed scholarship incentive differs from a cash-for-kidneys 
regime sufficiently to limit the potential harms caused by an unrestricted 
market regime.  First, the scholarship program is a system of delayed 
compensation, providing a benefit that cannot be transferred into quick 
cash, but which is more likely than a simple cash donation to provide long-
term benefits to donors.  Second, while there are concerns that college-
aged individuals are particularly susceptible to financial coercion and to 
misapprehend the risks involved with various courses of action, the 
proposed scholarship can be structured to respond to some of those 
concerns. 
Donating a kidney is not like getting a tattoo or maxing out one’s credit 
cards.  The informed consent procedures currently in place, combined with 
the time necessary to match donors with recipients,264 provides a certain 
 
 260. Lisa Lerer, The Scourge of the Billable Hour: Could Law-Firm Clients Finally Kill It Off?, 
SLATE, Jan. 2, 2008, at www.slate.com/id/2180420/fr/rss/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2009). 
 261. Charles Toutant, Public Interest Law Jobs Still Paying Peanuts, LAW.COM, Sept. 12, 
2006, at www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1157978115780 (last visited Apr. 
9, 2009). 
 262. The ABA notes that “[o]nly those students with debt burdens [in the $40,000 range] 
tend to enter public interest positions.”  Student Loan Forgiveness, supra note 259. 
 263. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 264. The Kidney Foundation of Canada suggests that the process to determine if an 
individual can donate a kidney takes between three to six months.  The Kidney Found. of 
Canada, Living Kidney Donation—Frequently Asked Questions, at www.kidneyfoundation.ab. 
ca/Be_Involved/FAQ%20Live%20Donation.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2008).  The transplant 
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check on impulse decisions.  For example, in one reported study, the 
University of Minnesota screened 142 nondirected donors for transplant, 
rejecting 23 donors (16%) for medical reasons and another 15 (11%) for 
nonmedical reasons.265  In fact, unlike the gentleman applying ink at the 
local tattoo parlor, medical professionals tend to be overcautious in 
verifying that the donor is truly willing to donate—going so far as to provide 
potential recipients with last minute excuses of incompatibility if the donor 
gets cold feet,266 or reject adult donors who seem too media focused, or 
whose immediate family is concerned that the donation is not fully 
voluntary.267 
There are risks that the proposed scholarship program might prey on 
underprivileged populations, as critics claim military recruiting preys on 
vulnerable high school populations.268  Military recruiters are effectively in 
the position of counseling high school students about a life-altering 
 
center at the University of Florida Shands Hospital suggests that it takes four to eight weeks to 
match a donor with a recipient.  UF & Shands Jacksonville Transplantation, Kidney 
Transplantation, at http://jax.shands.org/hs/transplantation/services.asp#kidney (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2009). 
 265. Adams, supra note 128, at 585 (citing C. Jacobs et al., Nondirected Donation: Who 
Volunteers? Who is Rejected?, 1 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 249 (2001)).  See also L. 
Kranenburg et al., The Psychological Evaluation of Samaritan Kidney Donors: A Systematic 
Review, 38 PSYCHOL. MED. 177, 177-78 (2007) (reporting that psychological evaluation is a 
standard part of the donor evaluation procedure).  A national conference of the 
transplantation community held in 2001 defined several categories of “unacceptable donor 
expectations” about transplantation, including the desire for media attention, a desire by the 
donor to select the recipient by gender, race, or ethnicity, or a desired involvement in the 
recipient’s life after donation.  Adams, supra note 128, at 585. 
 266. Joel D. Kallich & Jon F. Merz, The Transplant Imperative: Protecting Living Donors 
from the Pressure to Donate, 20 J. CORP. L. 139, 152 (1995) (reporting that physicians 
“[o]ccasionally . . . provide a technical excuse (such as a poor match) for potential donors 
expressing their desires not to proceed with the act.”); Arthur L. Caplan, Am I My Brother’s 
Keeper?, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1195, 1205 (1993) (arguing that for consent to be valid, the 
donor must be able to withdraw consent, meaning that “physicians seeking consent must be 
willing to provide a ‘cover story’ or some form of ‘medical excuse’ for the prospective donor 
should the donor refuse or withdraw their consent.”); Michael J. Saks, Social Psychological 
Perspectives on the Problem of Consent, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 41, 49 (Gary 
B. Melton et al. eds., 1983) (reporting that doctors often use the excuse of incompatibility to 
shield a prospective donor from family pressure if the intended donor chooses not to donate). 
 267. Parents of a potential donor, a member of the religious group called the Jesus 
Christians, contacted North American transplant centers and raised questions about the 
donor's ability to provide informed consent to the kidney procedure.  A hospital in Toronto 
where the donor's transplant was scheduled rejected him as a donor on the grounds that he 
was “motivated by the desire for publicity . . . not by altruism.”  Meckler, supra note 127. 
 268. Davies, supra note 225, at 15 (reporting that recruiters provide aggressive sales 
pitches regarding the educational benefits from military service while underselling the 
possibility of going to war). 
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decision, and critics argue that they provide less than complete information 
in part because they are so keen to recruit.  However, there is no reason to 
think that recruiting for the scholarship program need be as aggressive as 
military recruiting is perceived to be.  Indeed, it would be a breach of 
medical ethics to fail to provide a prospective donor with the information 
necessary to make an informed decision.269  At minimum, the scholarship 
program should put a firm cap of eighteen as the minimum age to donate a 
kidney.  This should ameliorate some of the inherent risks regarding the 
arguably limited judgment of potential donors.  In addition, all information 
necessary to meet informed consent requirements under rules of medical 
ethics should be provided to prospective donors after they reach a minimum 
age of eighteen.  One additional safeguard for donors would be to provide 
the prospective donor with her own doctor, unassociated with the transplant 
team, to avoid any potential unconscious pressure on the part of the 
surgeon to coerce consent. 
V.  STATUTORY OBSTACLES TO THE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM 
The final obstacle to the scholarship incentive is statutory: the incentive is 
against the law under the National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) and 
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA).  Specifically, a scholarship is likely 
valuable consideration for a donated kidney donation creates a valuable 
consideration, and it is a felony under NOTA to offer or receive anything of 
value in exchange for a kidney.  While this article has argued that the 
scholarship program is likely to be palatable as a means of providing 
financial incentives for organ donation, as well as effective at increasing the 
incidence of living donation, there are statutory provisions that make the 
program difficult to realize.  NOTA prohibits the transfer of any organ, 
including kidneys,270 “for valuable consideration for use in human 
transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.”271  Any kidney 
shipped across state lines would be subject to that prohibition.  In addition, 
the transfer of kidneys through intrastate activity is governed by the UAGA, 
parts of which have been adopted in one form or another by all fifty 
 
 269. Mark Unruh et al., Evaluation: Specific Issues for Living-Donor Kidney Transplantation, 
in LIVING DONOR TRANSPLANTATION 33, 45 (Henkie P. Tan et al. eds., 2007) (discussing the 
various health risks implicated by living donation of a kidney, and asserting that both medical 
professionals and the prospective donor have the responsibility to insure that the donor has 
“an acceptable risk profile”); Adams, supra note 128, at 582 (“Transplant centers that accept 
[nondirected donors] should document an informed consent process that details donor risks, 
assures donor safety, and determines that the goals and expectations of the [nondirected 
donor] and the recipient can be realized.”). 
 270. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000). 
 271. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2000). 
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states,272 which prohibits “a person that for valuable consideration 
knowingly purchases or sells a part for transplantation or therapy if removal 
of a part from an individual is intended to occur after the individual’s 
death”.273  Both statutes provide criminal penalties for the transfer of kidneys 
for valuable consideration.274 
These provisions create a substantial obstacle to the proposed 
scholarship program because as a statutory matter, scholarships are 
considered valuable consideration if there is a quid pro quo involved,275 
i.e., “any amount received which represents payment for teaching, research, 
or other services by the student required as a condition for receiving the 
qualified scholarship”.276  Altering the scholarship plan to a repayment or 
reimbursement of student loans would not correct this problem, as they, too, 
are considered taxable income, or valuable consideration,277 more a 
bargained-for exchange than a no-strings attached grant.278  Even third-
party payments would provide no relief.279 
Thus, under the current statutory framework, living donors would be 
liable for fines and jail time if they accepted a scholarship or loan 
forgiveness in return for donating a kidney, and any organization offering 
such a scholarship or loan forgiveness would also be criminally liable. 
There is, however, an exception to the rule that a scholarship is always 
valuable consideration and taxable income whenever there is a quid pro 
quo involved.  As discussed in Part III.C, supra, athletic scholarships are 
treated by the IRS as if there were no quid pro quo involved in playing 
college athletics.280  It is unclear why the IRS persists in embracing the legal 
 
 272. 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies to Declaratory Judgments § 86 (2003). 
 273. REV. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 16 (2008). 
 274. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(b) (2000); REV. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 16(a) (2008). 
 275. The Supreme Court embraced the “quid pro quo” test as the correct metric to 
measure whether a scholarship should be treated as tax-exempt, or instead as taxable income.  
Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 757-58 (1969) (finding that a grant given to a taxpayer by 
the taxpayer’s employer to enable research and writing, where the taxpayers was obligated to 
return to the employer after the research period, is a bargained-for exchange rather than a 
no-strings attached grant and thus properly taxable). 
 276. I.R.C. § 117(c)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2005). 
 277. I.R.C. § 108(f)(3) (2000).  There are exceptions to treating educational loan 
forgiveness as income, but those exceptions would not apply to the proposed scholarship 
incentive. 
 278. Bingler, 394 U.S. at 757-58. 
 279. Joseph M. Dodge, Scholarships Under the Income Tax, 46 TAX LAW. 697, 725 (1993) 
(“[C]ompensation received directly or indirectly from third parties (as might occur in the case 
of internships) would on no account be excluded under section 117.”). 
 280. See supra notes 174-178 and accompanying text.  Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 states 
that athletic scholarships are not taxable income because the university requires no particular 
activity of any of its scholarship recipients.  Although students who receive athletic scholarships 
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fiction that athletic scholarships are unconnected to any services required 
from the recipient-athlete, but perhaps the Service does so because there 
would be no other way to preserve the tax-exempt status of athletic 
scholarships under the quid pro quo test.  Such a determination provides a 
legal opening for the proposed scholarship incentive: sometimes a 
scholarship granted as part of a bargained-for exchange is treated as a tax-
exempt gift instead of valuable consideration.  This is a weak limb on which 
to hang the hopes of the proposed scholarship incentive, but it does provide 
a framework for discussion.  If fielding a basketball team, generating 
revenue, and recruiting for a university is a goal sufficient to justify special 
tax-exempt treatment of a bargained-for exchange, then providing a 
scholarship that will increase the needed supply of kidneys, thereby 
extending the lives of recipients and improving the quality of those lives, 
might merit the same type of special treatment.281 
Tax scholar Joseph M. Dodge suggests that where a scholarship 
includes valuable consideration—i.e., a graduate student teaching courses 
for the university—the value of the services provided is correctly taxable, and 
scholarship value in excess of those services should be tax-exempt.282  
Consider a graduate student who received a $10,000 scholarship, and was 
required to teach a course as a condition for receiving the scholarship.  If 
other teachers were paid $4,000 for the same work, then $4,000 of the 
graduate student’s scholarship would be taxable income, and the remaining 
$6,000 would be tax exempt.  Applying the same logic to the proposed 
kidney scholarship incentive, kidneys cannot be sold on the open market, 
and the transplantation industry treats them as if they had a value of $0.  
Thus, the entire value of the scholarship award should be tax-exempt 
because there is no value in the service provided—donating a kidney.  
Unlike teaching at the university, there would be no valuable proxy for the 
kidney, as it cannot be sold or even overtly assigned value when transferred 
from one entity in the procurement process to another.  This argument is a 
sleight-of-hand of sorts, given that the thrust of this article is to argue that 
the donation of a kidney is properly worth the value of a college education 
 
do so because of their special abilities in a particular sport and are expected to participate in 
the sport, the scholarship is not cancelled in the event the student cannot participate and the 
student is not required to engage in any other activities in lieu of participating in the sport. 
 281. Indeed, Michele Goodwin argues for a waiver of the criminal sanctions in NOTA, in 
order to facilitate attempts by states to work out a successful program for partial 
commodification.  Goodwin, The Body Market, supra note 10, at 633.  Such a waiver would 
allow states to try out the scholarship incentive proposed in this article.  Part II, supra provides 
the justification for allowing the attempt. 
 282. Dodge, supra note 279, at 724.  Dodge proposes a hypothetical where the graduate 
student is provided with a $10,000 scholarship by the university.  As part of the qualification 
for the scholarship, the student teaches courses for the university.  Id. 
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to the donor, to the party paying for the recipient’s dialysis, and perhaps to 
society at large.  But so long as the structure of organ procurement laws 
maintains the legal fiction that there can be no market value for a donated 
organ, the tax laws which would otherwise treat the scholarship received as 
a bargained-for exchange for a donated kidney might justify an analogous 
legal fiction to shield the scholarship incentive from liability under NOTA 
and the UAGA. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This article provides an opening volley in favor of a scholarship program 
to stimulate the living donation of kidneys.  There remains work to be done 
in this area.  A more focused study on the rhetorical function of scholarship 
benefits, as well as an empirical study of how a potential scholarship 
incentive would be received is necessary.  The discussion of the potential 
coercive effect of scholarships is also nascent, and empirical work in that 
area would be exceedingly valuable.  Nevertheless, I am optimistic that a 
scholarship regime could safely negotiate the space between altruistic 
symbolism and economic reality, and effect a positive, lasting change in 
both the lives of those waiting for kidneys and those looking for educational 
opportunities. 
 
 
